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A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Venezuelan mil i tar-y expend i tures have been studied
many times. Few of these studies have produced any
reliable estimates tor future predictions. This thesis
was undertaken to prove a rel iable, systematic method
for the purpose of predicting future Venezuelan defense
expend i c tures can be made wi th the sole use of economic




tial data base of economic variables for 96
countries was utilized. Fact o r a n a 1 y s i s of these
v a r i ab 1 e s was performed t o s h ow m a ..i o r t r e n d s .
De scr i m i n a t e anal y s i s was c on ducted i n or der to d i v i de
t h e c ou n t r i e s into two gr ou ps . A mu 1 t i p 1 e r e gr e ss i on
analysis model was used for the group containing
Me n ezue 1 a to de t e r m i n e the c or relation coefficient s of
the e con om i c v ar i ab 1 e s to Men e z u e 1 an de fen se
e x p e n d i tures.
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I I . HISTORY OF VENEZUELA
Venezuela is si tuated on the northern coast of South
America, bordered by Columbia on the West, Brazil on the
South, and Guyana on the East. Venezuela was discovered
in 1498 by Columbus on his third voyage. Venezuela,
along with what are now Columbia, Panama, and Ecuador-
revolted against Spain in 1310. In 1S21 they gained
their independence and formed the "Great Columbia"
union. In 1830 the "Great Columbia" union separated and
Venezuela began its own existence as a sovereign state.
Throughout the remainder of the 19th century,
Venezuela was characterized by frequent periods of
political instability, dictatorships and revolutionary
turbu lance. The beginning of the 20th century for
Venezuela was marked with continued dictatorship but
also by a growing awareness of the value of the
country's natural resources.
Although small in size and population, Venezuela has
large deposits of natural resources. The most abundant
of i ts natural resources is petroleum. Dr i 11 i rig for
Venezuelan petroleum began as early as 1836 by Guzman
Blanco. By 1 ? 12 B 1 a n c os Com p a n y w a s p r odue i n g o n 1
y
sixty barrels of crude oil da i 1 y and was forced to
d i sso 1 v e [ Re f . 1 : p . 4 3. This was a sp uttering start
13
for an industry that was to play such a major part in
the economic development of Venezuela.
Rafael Max 'v'al 1 adares , a citizen of Venezuela, is
often said to be the man responsible for the first
f or e i gn i n u e s tme n t in Venezuela oil e x p 1 or a t i on . He
s
i
gn e d a contract in 1910 g i u i n g him t he rights to
e x p 1 or e an d deu e 1 op the Par i a p en i n su la. Be n i t e
z
district in Sucre state, Peder rales, and the nearby
islands in the Orinoco delta. The 1 i f e of the contract
was forty-seven years. Four days later, Ual 1 adares
transferred the contract to the Bermudez Company. The
Bermudez Company, based in Philadelphia, was an
aff i 1 iate of General Asphal t which had unprof i table
relation s w i t h (Jenezuela earlier.
Two years later, 'v'al 1 adares signed another contract
with the Venezuelan government. He again used bribery
to exploit the corruption in government in order to
ob t a i n v a 1 u abl e c on c ess i on s • He rece i v e d the r i gn t s t
o
explore and develop the subsoil of Sucre, Monagas,
Anzoategui
,
Nueva Esparta, Truillo, Merida, Zul ia, Lara,
Falcon, Carabolo, and Yaracury. This enormous area
covered 27 mill ion hectares (about 63 mill ion acres)
[Ref. 1: p. 143. Two days after signing the contract,
'v'al 1 adares sold the contract to another General Asphalt
aff il iate, the Caribbean Petroleum Company.
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The contract was in clear violation of Venezuela
law. Under the Venezuela mining laws, the maximum area
that could be granted was 800 hectares. Clearly the
V'alladares contract -for 27 mill ion hectares was in
direct violation o-f this law. No protests were lodged
against V'alladares by one, single, Venezuelan. Charges
were later brought against V'alladares by an American and
an Engl i shman . Corruption and bribery were again on
V'alladares side when the Venezuelan Supreme Court ruled
that the mining law restricting area concessions to 300
hectares was unconstitutional.
The door was now open -for larger area grants to be
explored -for petroleum. Large numbers of bidders for
the Venezuelan subsoil rights descended hungrily upon
the country. Foreign investment in Venezuela soared.
The British were among the -first to stake th i er claims
in the northwest coastal area and in the Orinoco delta.
American capital in Venezuelan oil development did not
arrive until several years later.
Standard Oil had concentrated on controlling the
production o-f petroleum in only the United States. It
took World War I to show Standard Oil the importance o-f
large petroleum reserves during a con-fl ict. With the
United States oil reserves seriously depleted after-
World War I, Standard Oil and other U.S. companies with
vast capital resources, entered the field of oil
15
exploration in Venezuela. Investments by United States
companies in Venezuelan oil explorations grew by leaps
and bounds:
Year U.S. I nves tmen ts In Uene zue 1 a
1 924 *11 Mi 1 1 i on
1925 *72 Mi 1 1 i on
1926 *128 Mi 11 i on
1 928 *157 Mi 1 1 i on
Figure 1 - U . S . I n v e s tme n t s In Ve n e z u e 1 an i
Produc t i on
The Venezuelan oil industry grew, but not without
legal battles and continued corruption. Standard Oil
and Royal Dutch Shell o-ften lodged protests against each
other over territorial rights. A truce was finally
reached between these two large investers in 1929. It
was an "As Is" agreement, each agreeing to keep off the
t e r r i t or y o f the o
t
her .
The c or r up t i on in the oil in du s t r y continued tor-
many years. The then President of Venezuela, Juan
V i n c e n t e Gom e z , and his M i n i iters made illegal and
16
unethical concessions to the -foreign oil companies in
exchange for money. Gomez and his Ministers used the
oi 1 concessions as it it were a matter of personal
wealth, not a matter of State wealth.
By 1936 Venezuela had become a major, world exporter
of petroleum but exported 1 ittle else. In 1936
petroleum accounted for 85% of Venezuelan exports. Land
that had once been a major producer of cacao now sat
idle. Harvest of cacao was at a minimum as the rural
areas generally became impoverished. Ranches and
haciendas were foreclosed by banks and loan offices.
Much of the income from petroleum went into the hands of
government officials and not to the State where it could
have been used to improve education and diversify the
private industry into areas other than petroleum.
An Oil Reform law was passed in 1943 by the
Venezuelan Congress. Although it favored the oil
companies, it did improve State income through an
increase in oil t ax e s
.
Late in 1945, there was a su c c e ssf u 1 r e v o 1 u t i on ar y
coup. The coup was headed by the Ace i on Democrat ica
party and young members of the mi 1 i tary. The revolution
had been sparked by an increase in publ ic awareness of
the c or r up t i on in the Ve n e z u e 1 a gov e r nme n t
.
After the revolution, the rul ing junta striked to
restore law and order, and to establ ish a Democratic
rul ing government.
A. REMISED PETROLEUM TAX
The revolutionary government decreed an
extraordinary tax on December 31, 1945. The decree
affected only taxpayers o-f that year with an income of
more than Bs. 300,00 0. It affected a total of 75
persons or business entities o-f the 20,000 in the
country which paid income taxes. Additional tax funds
of Bs. 93,381,775 were collected, of which 93.5% came
f r om the oil c omp an i e s . The justification -For the n ew
tax was based on sol id arguements. The old 1943 oi
1
bill called for Venezuela to receive an amount equal to
halt of the industries earnings. The new tax insured
th i s [Ref . 3: p . 986] .
On October 27, 1946, the first democratic elections
were held in Venezuela. 0>y>er 36/. of the population
turned out to cast thier ballots. The voters elected
160 delegates to the National Constituent Assembly [Ref
1: p. 1133.
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Figure 2 - National Constituent Assembly Elections -1946
The objectives of the new administration were both
to attend to the immediate national needs, and to give a
more permanent solution to the fundamental problems of
the country.
The Constituent Assembly ratified a new Constitution
on Ju 1 y 5 , 1 947 . Th i s const i tu t i on was descr i bed by
Professor Austin F. Mac dona Id, of the University of
Cal ifornia, as "The most democratic document in the
history of the Venezuelan nation" CRef. 2: p. 430]. The
Ace i on Democ r a t i c a p ar t y also s t r i v e d to rest or e h on est y
and prestige to those in public s e r v ice.
A new law called the Illegal Enrichment of Pu'bl ic
Off i cal s was s i on e d into 1 aw Oc t ober 18, 1943. Th i s
19
required all government employees to make publ ic sworn
declarations of thier assets upon entering and leaving
office.
B. ELIMINATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND LOW SALARIES
More jobs were created in the oil industry for
'v'e n e z u e 1 an s . Emp 1 oyme n t of Men ezuelans in the oil
industry grew to 52,924 in 1947 and to 68,418 in 1943
The number of Venezuelans participating in the Social
Security System grew from 57,333 in 1944 to 77,842 in
1948 CRef. 53. Oil production in Venezuela also
i n creased .















F i ourure o nezuelan Oil Production 1938-194!
'v'e nezuelan oil wor kers recei u e d a 75V: p ay r a i se
between 1946 and 1948 largely due to labor union
n e go t a t i on s w i t h the oil c omp an i es . The y a 1 so received
Sundays off with pay, and a -fifteen day paid vacation





Average Basic Da i 1 y Wage 12.9 17.38 4.48 34 .
7
Other Cash Payments 3.3 13.02 9. 22242.6
Total Da i 1 y Wage s 16.7 30.4 13.7 82.0
Indirect Benefits 6.38 12.08 5.72 39.9
Total 23.06 42.48 19.42 84.2
Figure 4 - Venezuelan Oil Workers"' Wages 1946-1948
C. PROVIDE ADEQUATE AMOUNTS OF FOOD AT AN
AFFORDABLE COST
The avai 1 ab i 1 i ty and consumption of food in
Venezuela was well below that recommended by a federal
conference held at Hot Springs CRef. 63 • The government
intervened to increase food imports to be distributed
through commercial channels at a price lower than the
i mp or t cost. In 1945, food i mp or t s we r e v a 1 u e d at Bs
.
63 , 1 46 mill i on . I n 1 948 , the y totaled Bs . 374 , 920 , an
increase of almost 50 0*-: CRef. 1: p. 1623.
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Food 1 ?43 Con sump t i on M i n i mum Need
Flour, Rice, Cereals
Cheese, Butter, Milk





Citrus Fruits And Tomatos 65,265
'v'eqetabl es, Rotates, Etc. 76,725
265,265 Tons
•"'.dp, 4/.=i






1 20 , 720
33 , 240
37, 630
1 ? , ?20
1 17,360
440 ,640
Figure 5 - Food Needs Vs. Actual 1 ?43 Consumption
D. INCREASE INDUSTRIAL SECTORS EARNINGS
By 1 ?45 some industrial ists and merchants were on
the '.,' erqe o t b a n k r u p t c y . The increase in the purchasing
p ow e r of the w o r k e r s a 1 o n g w i t h the go y e r n rri e n t ' s p o 1 i c y
o-f credits to i n d u s t r y were in s t r am e n t a 1 in the recovery
of these t i rmis and the establ ishment of numerous others.
The number o-f business firms in the Federal District
i n c r e ase d t r om 1 , ? 1 ? i n 1 ?47 t o 12, ? 1 by 1 ?48 C Re -f . 5 3 .
E. INCREASE PRODUCTION OF MEAT AND MILK
A very prosperous cattle industry had once existed
in Venezuela. By 1945 it had so declined, it was
threatened with extincti on . Only 2 . S m i 1 1 i on head of
cattle grazed in the pastures while 7 million head of
cattle were required to supply enough meat tor the
populace. The government now assumed the respons i b i 1 i ty
of promoting cattle raising and milk production.
The Ministry of Agriculture and the Venezuelan
De v e 1 opme n t Cor p or a t i on wor k e d c 1 ose 1 y t oge t h e r
formulating a viable program. The plan included
technical supervision of credits, the importation of
cattle to breed with Venezuelan cattle, the provision of
water for cattle through we 1 1 -dr i 1 1 i ng and construction
of reservoirs, and the prevention of cattle diseases.
In 1947, more than Bs. 35 m i 1 1 ion was invested by the
government in this program. This produced 100 water
we lis, 65 r e se r v o irs, an d hun dr e ds of i mp or t e d bulls
[Ref . 1 : p . 169]
.
F. INCREASE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
For years, many forests in Venezuela had been
c omp 1 e t e 1 y de s t r oyed . I n some p ar t s of the c ou n t r y this
had caused massive erosion, leaving land that was once
fertile, unfit to till. The government established the
Forest Ranger Service in an attempt to end this
destruc t i on
.
I n 1 946 , 80
,
hectare s we re under cu 1 t i v a t i on
with only 110,000 hectares having permanent irrigation
svs t ems . Irrigated land provided a better cr op—y i e 1
d
per hectare and produced three crops a year vice one -For
un irri ga ted land. On 1 y 70 agricultural mac h i n e s we r
e
available to farm the land. Irrigation and
mechanization were deemed imperative to improve
product i o n
.
In its first two years in office, the government
built irrigation channels for 20,000 hectares of land
and i mp or ted 2,0 agricultural mac hi i n e s to he 1 p har v e s t
the crops. The increase in agricultural production was
















Figure 6 - Venezuelan Production In Metric Tons Of Diet
Stapl es
G. EDUCATION REFORM
Simon Bol ivar once said, "The ignorance of the
people is the instrument of their own destruction".
This had certainly been true of Venezuela. In 1941,
Venezuela had 2 mi 1 1 ion citizens older than 15 years of
age. 1.3 m i 1 1 i on
,
or 75 percent of them were
i 1 1 i terate. An aggressive program was undertaken to
p r ou i de 'v'e n e z u e 1 an s w i t h a better education.
Between 1945 and 1943 attendance at primary schools
increased by 78 percent. Attendence at secondary-
schools increased by 91 percent. The number of teacher •
was increased by 62 percent and the number of schools
a 1 mos t doubled. The j u n t a was mak i n g a frontal a 1 1 ac
k
on i 1 1 i teracy i n Venezuel a CRef . 1 : p . 210] .
1945 1948
M i n i s t r y Of Edu c a t i on
Budge t
Pr i m a r y S c h o o 1 E n r o 1 1 m e n t 28 1 ,
Secondary School Enrollment 11,598
Teachers 8,250
Percentage Of 111 iterate Adul ts 75%





Figure 7 - Venezuelan Educational Reform Report - 1943
H. A STEP BACKWARDS
A successful mi 1 i tary coup d'etat, headed by Colonel
Carlos Delgado Chalbaud occurred on November 24, 1943.
The pol i tical regime in which the Venezuelan people had
placed their trust and hope was gone, many of i ts
officials in jail. As in p r e - 1 9 4 5 dictatorships,
corruption in the new mil i tary rul i ng party was rampant.
Chalbaud was assinated in 1950 and a mil i tary junta,
headed by Colonel Marcos Pirez Jimenez took charge. The
junta promised general elections but took thier time
before h o 1 d i n g them. Th e e 1 ec t i on s we re held on
N o ',' em b e r 30, 1 9 5 2 .
26
The elections and events immediately preceeding the
elections can best be described through the reports of
international news agencies. As described by the
Economist of London, December 11, 1952:
The elections on November 30 were impressive in
their order! in ess. S^cr'ecy of the ballet was
observed and more than SO percent of the electorate
voted. The two opposition parties allowed to
function legally, the 1 ef t-of -cen ter LIRD and the
Cat hoi ic Cope i had no criticism of the voting. As
the first results came in URD was getting 54 percent
of the votes, Copei 15 percent and the FEI, the
government party, only 25 percent [Ref. 8]
.
Local radio stations had been transmitting election
bulletins that revealed a sol id defeat of the
dictatorship. The entire world k n ew by the next day
that the opposition had won the election.
On December 1, the transmission of news from
'v'e n e z u e 1 a to the ou t s i de wor Id was su dde n 1 y interrupted
by censorship. Local radio stations were occupied by
pel i ce and were only permi tted to transmi t music and
commercial anouncemen t s . On December 2, with the
support of six chiefs of the armed forces. Colonel Perez
Jimenez proclaimed himself provisional president. As
described by the New York Times:
What happened in Venezuela these last few days
comes as a shock to all who cherish the growth of
democracy in Latin America. The shock is no less
great because the leader of the mil itary junta,
C ol onel Perez Jimenez, a
p
pears t o h a v e d o n e j u s
t
what e v e r y o n e expected. He t o o k s e v e r a 1 years to
arrange an election for a constituent assembly,
thought he had i t sewed up, and then, when -
ace or ding to the on ] y credible f i q
u
res - he s aw that
he was losing, he reacted in the ol d-f as i oned way
and is retaining power by force.
This is not the way that he and his supporters
explain what happened. According to them, the
electoral tide, which was running at two and a halt
to one against them for at least one-third of the
votes, took a sudden turn and gave the Government
group (the FEl) a numerical superiority. Thereupon
- although even the total claimed by the clique
represented less than 30 percent of the electorate -
Perez Jimenez, "by decision of the armed forces,"
proclaimed himself provisional president. Yet,
according to the elect or i a 1 1 aw wh i ch the j u n t a
itself drew up, the constituent assembly was to
choose the provisional president on Jan 10 CRef.9].
The road that was to have been opened by popular-
election for constitutional government remained closed.
From 1953 to 1953 Perez Jimenez imposed a strict
dictatorship on the country. The wealth of the country
brought increased prosperity for a few, namely the
dictator and his associates. The common Venezuelan saw
a decrease in his standard of 1 iving and his freedoms.
Some social programs were reduced while others were
el i m i n a t e d .
The freedom for unions to organize and to bargain
for better wages and working conditions was taken away
from the Venezuelan people. The workers and peasants
had lower 1 iving standards than in 1948. The real value
of the workers'' wages can be shown as their purchasing
power, as determined by the cost-of-1 iving index CRef
.
10 3.
Aug. Percentage Cost -Of- Real










Figure 3 - Venezuelan Workers" Wages 1945 - 1953
The situation o -f the prima r y schools as re v e a 1 e d in
1954 wa s d i sas t r ou s . Th ere we r e one million children in
Venezuela aged seven to fourteen. Of these, only
440,747 attended school, less than half of those
eligible for pn mar y sc h oo Is. The remaining 560,0
added to the growing number of ill iterates. Although
the birth rate in Venezuela was 75,000 children per
year, their attendance in primary schools decreased
CRet. 113.
The Venezuelan dictatorship showed the same
incompetence in other government activities as in
education. From 1945 to 1943, the agricultural
production had shown tremendous increases. This was
1 arge 1 y due to the bu i 1 di ng of i rr i gat i on channe 1 s and
the i mp or t a t i on of agr i c u 1 t u r a 1 machines. No i r r i ga t i on
channels were built during the dictatorship until 1953,
delaying any possible increase in agricultural
production by at least five years.
I . A DEMOCRACY THAT LASTS
On January 23, 1 958 the armed -forces, with
overwhelming popular support, ousted President Perez
Jimenez -from government of -f ice and formed a Junta
comprised of two civilians and three military officers.
The junta made known their main objective was to
establish a honest, democratic go v e r nm e n t . C i v i 1
1 iberties were restored, censorship was removed and
political pr i son e r s we r e released pr omp 1 1 y . Pr oc e du r e s
for democratic elections were established quickly.
Under the election guidelines, national elections would
be held e^ery 5 years to elect the President and Members
of Congress. The state legislatures, and the city-
councils would be directly elected. The President could
be elected to only one term and could not be reelected
until 10 years following the end of that term.
Elections held in December 1 95S chose Romulo
Betancourt, candidate of the Ace i on Democrat ica party,
as President of the Republ ic. Under President
B e t a n c o u r t the government inaugurated a p r o g r am t o
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mode r n i ze agriculture, i mp 1 erne n t industrial exp an s i on
,
and provide educational opportunities tor its people.
The steady growth of the manufacturing industry was
a key f ac tor in d i v e r s i f y i n g the 'Jen e z u e 1 an e c on omy .
The average annual growth rate of manufacturing for the
periods: 1955-60 was 7.7 percent, 1960-65 was 9.0
percent, 1965-70 was 4.4 percent, and 1970-73 was 7.9
percent .
The production in the textile industry increased by
221 percent between 1956 and 1970. This not only
provided much needed jobs for Venezuelans but also
reduced the amount of imports required. Locally
manufactured goods satisfied a larger percentage of the
domestic market requirement.
A paper industry was establ i shed in 1956, not only
under the stimulus of i mpor t-subst i t i ons but also to
keep p ac e wit h a r ap i d i 1 y e x p an d i n g deman d . In 1 957
paper production in Venezuela was 7 thousand tons. By
1964 production had increased to 135 thousand tons and
in 1970 it totaled 220 thousand tons CRef. 12].
The expansion of the steel industry marked a vital
stage in the transition of the Venezuelan economy
t owar ds the in du
s
trial =U_|f 'enezuela had two resources
that helped advance the steel industry, an abundance of
h ydroel ec tr i c p ow e r a v a i 1 a b 1 e at a 1 ow c o s t and large
reserves of high grade iron ore. The steel production
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in 1953 was 40 thousand tons. With the completion of
the Orinoco steel plant in 1962, the production rose to
625 thousand tons in 1965 and to 924 thousand tons in
1972. Some of this steel was destined tor the world
market u i a exports [Ref. 13].
Venezuelan petroleum had accounted tor more than
h a It the w o r 1 d " s e x p o r t s in the i mm e d i a t e post-war-
period. It lost a substantial part of its share of the
world market as a result of the rapidly increasing
sup pi i es of crude oils from the Middle East, North
Africa and the Soviet Union. Venezuel a ' s s h a r e w a
s
reduced to less than one-third by I960 and to one- tenth
in 1970. Venezue 1 an petroleum exports to the United
States h av e r ema i n e d s t a t i on ar- y since the late 1 950 ' s
due to restrictions on oil i rnp or t s i mp ose d by the Un i t e
d
States. The combined action of these factors account
for the fact that Venezuelan exports, whose volume had
i n c r e a = e d b v 6 1 '/. in the 195 ' s , incre a s e d b y o n 1 y 2 5/i i n
the 1960's. At the beginning of the 1970"s , the
Venezuelan government, in view of the rise in oi 1 prices
and the inadequate increases in their reserves, placed
limitations on product i on by e s t ab 1 i sh i n g max i mum ou tpu
t
levels below those placed bv OPEC [Pef. 14].
President Bet a n c o u r t was the first d em o c r a t i c a 1 1 >•
elected president to c om p 1 e t e his term of office. All
presidents that -Followed him would be democratically
e 1 ec ted .
Raul Leoni, also o-f the Ace i on Democrat ica party,
was elected president in 1964. In 1969, Ra-fael Caldera
of the Com i te de Organ i zac i on Pol i t i ca El ec toral
I
n
depend i en te (COPE I) party was elected president. His
Mar c h 1 96? i n augur a t i on mar k e d the c ou n t r y " s f i r s t
peaceful transfer of power to a president from another
political party. This helped to stabl ize the democracy
President Caldera was succeeded by AD's Carlos
Andres Perez, a vetern party pol i t i c i an and former-
Be tan court Interior Minister. In 1979 COPE I again
returned to power when Luis He rr era Camp i us became
Pres i den t
.
The current administration, inaugurated in February
1934, is headed by President Jaime Lusinchi . The new
adm i n i strat i on took' off i ce wh i 1 e v'enezue 1 a was in its
worst economi c crisis in oyer a decade . The economi c
deel ine appears to have bottomed out.
The country is gradually adjusting to the need to
live within a reduced oil inc ome ( down 30 percent since
1981) and without new foreign borrowing. Heavy
sh or t - 1 e rm bor r ow i n g in 1 930-81 and mass i u e capital
fl ight in 1932-83 had given the country two problems.
On e was a 1 ar ge sh or t - 1 e rm f or e i gn debt an d the o t h e r
was deel ining foreign reserves. In February 1983
Venezuela implemented a dual exchange system along with
import and price controls in order to halt the decline
in -foreign reserves. The decl i ne has reversed and
Ve nezuela's -Foreign re se r v e s h av e gr own t o o v e r $• 1 2
bill i on
. Du e to the import r e s t r i c t i on s , i mp or t s h ay
e
d r o p p e d f r om $13 billion in 1982 to $-6.8 billion i n
1933.
The key to rebuilding confidence in the Venezuelan
economy is reschedul i ng its massive foreign debt. The
pr i vate sec tor ' s fore i gn debt i s $-8 bill i on wh i 1 e the
publ ic sector's foreign debt is about $27 bill ion.
Ve n ezue 1 a is holding n e go t i a t i on s w i t h f or e i gn bank s on
the reschedul i ng of these debts.
J. DEFENSE SPENDING
The role of the mil i tary in any government, plays an
important part in the design and makeup of i ts mi 1 i tarv
forces. For many years, Venezuelan defense expenditures
were based on thier need for "internal defense". It was
not until the late 1 ?50 ' s that Venezuela decided they
required an "external defense". These two defense
concepts v ar y gr e a . 1 1 y in their cost and in their
a 1 l oc a t i on s to p ar t i c u 1 ar service branches.
When the role of the Venezuelan mill tary was
c o n f i n e d to maintain 1 aw a n d order internal 1 y , the
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defense expenditures were relatively small. The major
appropr i at i ons were for hand guns , rifles, ammun i t i on
,
and military pay. The need for, and the size, of the
air force was small . This changed in the late 1 950 '' s
.
'•Venezuela saw a need for external securi ty when
border disputes with Guyana and Columbia surfaced. The
r e q u i r erne n t for e x t e r n a 1 se c ur i t y f or 'v'e n e z u e 1 a still
remains today due to Cuban rebel insurgency activity.
The border disputes required development of larger armed
forces, organized and equipped on a more professional
level , and hence considerably more expensive. The
financial impact of expanding the air force and navy was
p ar t i c u 1 ar 1 y h i gh . Ma j or ap p r op r i at i on s we re for air-
craft, ships, advanced schools and increased mil i tary
pay. The role of the mi 1 i tary had changed as had i ts
cost as shown in Figures 9 and 10 CRef. ID.
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Figure 9 - Services' Share Of Total Approations 1940-70
Note Figures For 1950 & 1955 Are Not Available
Values In Mi 1 1 ions Of Bol iyars (Bs)
Expend i tures Mi 1 i tary Expend i tures A<
Fisical Military V. Of GDP V. Of Fisca'
Year GDP Sector Sector
1 940 na 369 37
1945 na 531 46
1950 1 1 326 20 74 137
1955 1 7S96 2933 240
I960 25671 6147 467
1965 37925 7400 596














Figure 10 - Venezuelan Mil i tary Expenditures In Current
Prices In Re 1 at i on To Gross Domes t i
c
Product (GDP) And Fiscal Sector Expenditure
III. PREVIOUS STUDIES
Given this background of socio-political developments in
Venezuela, the main issue addressed by this thesis is the
extent to which the pattern of Venezuelan mil i tary
expenditures are unique or to the extent to which they can be
explained by comparisons of the patterns of mil i tary
exp end i t u r e s i n o t h e r de
u
eloping countries.
Re 1 a t i u e 1 y few emp t r i c a 1 studies have ex am i n e d the
patterns of government spending pol icies of developing
countries, and in particular, the amount and share of
government budgets allocated to defense. In an early study
Martin and Lewis analyzed the size and composition of public
expenditures and revenues of 16 countries, 10 of which can be
classified as developing countries. Public expenditures were
divivded into current and capital expenditures, and for each
group a functional classification was made . The study found
that for current expenditures that wealthier countries spend
more than the poorer countries relative to GNP on defense, on
the public debt, on social security programs, and on food and
agricultural subsidies. The relative importance of the
remaining government expenditures was not related to per
cap i t a i ncome
.
The study by Martin and Lewis was one of the first
empirical tests of "Wagner's Law" i.e. the existence of a
p os i t i v e r e 1 a t i on sh i p be twee n the size of the public sector
and the level of economic development. Wagner argued that
public expenditures could be divided into two categories,
security and welfare, and that security expenditures were
bound to increase with the growth o+" the "progressive" state
as armies became larger and more capital-intensive. In
addition, further intrastate conflict between individuals was
generated by industrial i ration, necessitating increased
police control. In a similiar manner, welfare expenditures
would also increase with the level of" economic development as
the state gradually took on many of the private sector's




A mo re c om p 1 e t e statement of W a g n e r ' s L aw can be: in
industrialized countries, public sector activities an
d
expenditures grow in relative importance as real per capita
income increases. According to Wagner, there are essentially
three reasons to expect expanding state activity and
expenditures. First, the state has to expand its
adm i n i s t r a t i v e and protective f u n c t i on s bee au se of the
increasing complexity of legal relationships and
communications. Second, the state has to expand its role
because of* the increase in general publ i c services required
by an increasing! y affluent soc i e t y . Third, increases in
pop u 1 a t i on an d urbanization require higher public e x p e n d i t u r e
on law and order and economic regulation in order to maintain
the efficient operation of an increasingly c omp lex e c on omy i n
the rising
-frictions of urban life. Wagner also predicted an
expansion o-f public expenditures on education and the
distribution o-f income.
The -final element in Wagner's -framework is that as
industrial ization progresses, technological change and large
scale investment expenditures require larger amounts of
capital than the private sector can provide. Therefore, the
state must provide the necessary capital to finance large
scale investment projects.
A major test of Wagner's Law was undertaken by J. R. Lotz
in 1970 CRef. 17]. He investigated several components of
public expenditures, of which defense spending was one. He
performed a factor analysis of 37 developing countries (using
mid-1960s cross section data) to conclude that defense
spending was not closely related to the particular stage of
economic development of these countries. Lotz explains this
by using the hypothesis that there exists a certain minimum
-ize for a mil i tary establ ishment, determined by technical
factors. This i mp 1 ies a minimum level of defense spending
regardless of the size of the national income. He stated
that smaller, poorer nations have therefore been obi
i
gated to
spend more than their fair share on defense because of the
fear of possible mobilization of other wealthier states.
David Whynes performed a study in 1977 that was simil i ar
to Lotz's CRef. 13]. Whynes'' conclusions supported those of
Lotz and Wagn e r ' s Law . The results are not particular! y
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strong however, suggesting one or more pertinent -factors may
have been excluded.
A. VENEZUELAN FOREIGN DEBT
In principle, -fore i gn debt represents a 1 i ab i 1 i ty tor the
borrower and also produces an asset. Unfortunately, this was
often not the case tor Venezuela. Some of their loans were
not well invested while others were used to increase defense
expenditures. As a result, the ratio of external
debt-service to export goods and services rose sharply.
Lower oil prices and the rise of "Capital Fl ight" from
Venezuela added to the problem of an increasing foreign debt.
By 1983 the external debt was equivalent to 47 percent of
GDP . It would have required 35 percent of its e x p or t s t o
service the external debt [Ref. 193.
The thesis developed below is that previous attempts to
explain defense expenditure patterns using cross section data
have failed because they did not include a profile of
external debt and the relationship between debt and the
financing of defense expenditures. By incorporating external
debt and the financing of defense expenditures into the cross
section analysis, the study provides valuable insight into
the p a r am e t e r s n e c e s s a r y for a more detailed, time s e r i e
s
a n a 1 y s i s o f V e n e z u e 1 a .
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The analysis will attempt to prove whether external debt
will help in explaining a significant part of the pattern of
defense spending in Venezuela? This analysis uses a cross
section analysis con s i stent w i t h Waon e r ' s Law
.
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ig. D I 5C R I FT I ON QF ANA LY S I
S
A. FACTOR ANALYSIS
As noted in chapter III, pre v ious studies u s i n 9 c r o s s
section analysis did not consider the effects revenue
c on s t r a i n t s and external financing pi ay i n gov e r nme n
t
spending decisions. That such constraints exist for
developing countries has been stressed by Walter Heller CRef.
20] .
In the fol lowing section an attempt wi 1 1 be made to gain
some understanding of the effects of revenue constraint and
external sources of -funds on the pattern of mi 1 i tary
expenditures in our sample of developing countries.
Particular attention will be given to how these -factors
influence defense spending in Venezuela.
The data base used for cross sectional analysis differs
from those used in previous independent studies in two
respects. First, the sample is much larger. The initial
data base contained ?6 developing countries. Second, the
data base comprises both economic and socio—pol i tical
variables. Economic variables were taken from the World Bank
data base CRef. 21] and the International Money Fund CRef.
22], The pol i tical and social indicators were taken from the
Yale Data Base CRef. 233. The mil i tary expenditures were
taken from the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
CRef. 24].
In order to formulate relationships between mi 1 i tarv
expenditures and specify dimensions of the economy, factor-
analysis was used CRef. 25] . Factor analysis al lows for the
patterning of several variables into a smaller number of
linear c omb i n a t i on s of the v ar i ab 1 e s
.
Thirty-four variables for each country were used as
imputs into the factor analysis. The results of the
orthogonally rotated factor pattern, Table 1, indicated that
?? percent of the observed variance in the data set could be
accounted f or by se v en fact or s
.
Forty countries were retained in the analysis. The
remaining 56 were el imi rated from the factor analysis due to
n e c e s s a r y data not being available. The loadings of each
country on the seven factors is given in Tables 2 through S.
Each factor represents a different dimension of the
u n de r 1 y i n g e c on om i c debt conditions e x per- i enced by our samp 1 e
o f c o u n t r i e s .
It is interesting to note that Venezuela does not always
place at the high or low end of the spectrum. The same is
true of the other countries. This leads to a conclusion that
factor scores alone, although suggestive, are not sufficient
to group countries as high or low debtors or as any other
conee i vabl e catagor i zat i on based on the samp 1 e of econom i c
var i abl es i nc 1 uded i n one anal ys i s . Nor is it c 1 ear from
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Table 1
Orthogonally Rotated Factor Pattern: (Loadings)
Ec o n orri i c r i abl eE-
Variables
Factors Factors Gross
tigiYitatinq fonf^fjut inq Jnt|rn,
C< >r\-. umpt ion External l»-ht
Exports
External Fut Lie
£•: ' Ext ft nd
^.r, j ice ij.^t.
Gross Inflow Public Loans/
Exports 1982
Public Debt' Exports 1982
Resource Balance as » of GDP 1982
Growth in Public Consumption
1970-82
Public Fxternal Borrowing
Commi t ment s/Fxpor t s I r ) 8
2
Gross Inflow Public Loans/GDP 1982
Public Consumption as % of 'XP l c<82
Growth in Private Consumption
1970-1982
Pr l'/ste Consumpt ion as % of GDP 1960
Private Consumpt ion as \ of GDP 1982
Terms of Trade 19H2
Total Public External Debt 1982
Gross Inflow Public Loans 1970
Interest Payments on External
Debt 1970
Repayment of Principal on Public
l,oans 1982
Gross Inflow Public Loans 1982
Public External Borrowing
Commitments 198 2
Interest Payments on External
Debt 1982
Total Public External Debt 1970
N«t Inflow of Public External
Loans 19 70
Repayment of Frincipal on External
Loans 1982
Growth in fxports 1970-82





Average Maturity of Public
External Debt
Current Account Balance 1982
Puhli External Debt as » of GDP
1082
Exports as » of GDP 1 >R
2
Growth in Fxports I960- 1970
Puhlic Consumption as » of GDP
I960
Groutn in Imports 1970-e?
Fxternal Debt Service as *. of GDP
19R2










































































































































2 3 - !0 1"
1 7 -19 25
>1 3* 7
5 -8 - 16
29 1 10
9 . -7 9
- 7 1 -6









All military variables together with Gross Domestic Product and per capita income are emitted.
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Table 2
Country Factor Scores For Factor 1
:









4. Ho 1 i vi
j
-1 .251 3












1 1 . Paraguay
-0.6062
12. Cen . At r l can Rep.
-0.3525








16. Ma 1 ays l
a
-0.2398
1 7. Tun i s i a
-0.2020










23. Mo xi co
-0. 1269
24. Venezue 1 a
-0.065 3
25. E 1 Sal vador 0.0479
26. Kwurh la 0. 1 129
27. Arqe n t i na 0. 1188
2d. Co 1 oinb i a 0. 1393
29. Indi a 0.2503
30. Guat uma 1 a 0. 2876
31. N
l
ye t i a 0.3075
32. Al yer i a 0. 3260
3 3. [Jruyuay 0.5893
34. Sudan 0.6179
35. Jama i ca 0.6553
36. Dom i n 1 can Rep>ubl i c 0.8972
37. Ma 1 aw
i
1.2501
38. Ivory Coast 1.588 2




Country Factor Scores For Factor 2:




2. G t r- ti .- e -5.2601
3. ho 1 i v i a -3.2939
4. Cluii -3. 1120
5. Glut na -2. 3874
6 . i \ ist -i K i c-j -2.2553
7
. Ih i 1 i [>[j i [!••» -2.1711
ri . I'.in uiiii -1 .988 5
lJ . l'( -i u -1.9263
10. TIki i lunO -1 .8878
1 1 . 1 ' . 1 1 a < j 1 1 a y -1 .4533
12. Spj i n -0.8909
13. Mill -0.8001
14. M tut l tuuia -0.7809




1 7. Tun i ;. i a -0.40 30
1H. Kw.-Ui l.i -0. 3004
19. ('In hi -0.2683
20. (\:n . Al i u .hi 1- 1 (.
.
-0.0 380
21 . I'll ll 1 Op i u 0.2070
2 2 . I ruli i,< . . i .i 0.26 39
2 J. I'.ik i st in 0.8766
2 1 . Vl III.'IK' 1 1 1 .069 3
25. l.'O li Hill • 1 vi L . 1 6 5 5
20. 1 1 ;0|y.i.ini 1 . 1777
27. Ki >i i a 1 .2816
2m. CiU.il i lll.i 1 .1 1 .3695
29. A 1 ' j. i l a 1 .4794
30. J.una l .a 1 .4931
31 . SiU an 1.50 2 5
32. Im jfl 1.5378
3 3. A t i j < • 1 1 1 l 1 1 . i 1 .6393
34. UriHjiiay 1.8396
35. 1 ii >m i n i . .hi He [ml 1
1
lc 1.9734
36. N i vjtt l .1 2. 1722
37. InOla 3.3307
38. Mj l ,iw l 3.3971
39. [ vol y (.'i usl 4.00 38
40. Mi x ico 4.6507
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Table 4
Country Factor Scores For Factor-
Gross International R e s e r m e 5
1
.
Md Liwi -1 . 3833
2 . L>U< Li r 1 -L. 3014




4. ['. t h i p i a -1.1215
5 . Jama 1 ca -0.9842
6 . Rwanda -0.9074
7 . Maui 1 t .in 1 a -0.8214
H. ana -0.7378
y. )uay -0. 7286
10. ,a Lvador -0.7281
I I
.
ClUi L 1'ITI 1 1 .1 -0.6881
12. Chad -0.6759
1 3. I'.ik ibtjii -0.6004
14. Ki t aquay -0.5945
15.
1ft.




1 7. I!. 'II. nil II -0.5034
18. r.ii..un.i -0.4762
L9. Tun i i.. 1 a -0.4503
20. liol 1 V 1 ,1 -0. 3492
21 . Ivoi y i "u>i , t -0.2 372
2 2 . Mi • >: 1 f< > -0.0828
2 i. 1 ll till 1 II 1 1 .1 ll Ini
'J
'111 1 1 1 c -0.060 2
24. I'll i|t, 1 I .1 0. Iu27
25. It 1 u 0.2230
2b. ['III 1 I ppl 111 t) . 35 35
27. Z.iinh 1 .i 0. 3978
28. Ko r 1.' a 0.4096
2't. Chi !- 0.4 50 3
30. I sr.juI 0.4625
31. Inlulii.'M j 0.5626
32. I'u] t-IIlO 1 .1 0.6586
3 3. A Lijor 1 .1 0.85 70
34. Gtiit'ce 0.8900
35. M i Lr/.-.i.i 0.8^78
3b. II1.1 1 lurid 1 .0872
37. Ar j< n 1 111,1 1 .1 156
38. I rui i .i 1.96 38
19. '. 1 r n .' ii 1 • 1 i 2. 3875
40. Spa 1 n 3. 2244
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Table 5
Country Factor Scores For Factor 4:
Share Of 1932 External Publ ic Debt In GDP
1
.
I nil l j -1 .5818
2 Guj r i -ni.i 1 ,i -1 .4559
3. Ghana -1.4076
4. Ethiopia -1. 3944
5. Sudan -1 .1581
6. Col omb i a -1.0837
7. Vonoiiui 1 a -1.0523
8. Pa rayuay -1 .0067
9. N iqei i .1 -0.9689
10. t;l Sulva-lui -0.9331
1 1 . II r uu, ijj y -0.7912
12. Ooiri i n i can Ki.-pubi 1 ic -0.7558
1 i. A r t \ 1 r 1 1 iii 1 -0.5884
14. i*hi h -0.5333
15. Peru -0.4784
16. Spa in -0. 3265
1 7. M.ilawi -0. 3010
]H. Mux 1 -0.2499
1'). Pw.nui.i -0.2259
20. I VCt y 1 'Uil :. t -0.2202
21 . 1 rulorurs 1 .1 -0.1013
'> 2 l'.ik 1 :. 1 i 'M -0.0949
2 1. O 11 . At t 1 can Rep . 0.0666
24. Liol i vi j 0.0711
25. Tin i 1 .hi ! 0.2233
2b. Ph 1 1 1
[
[' 1 ii- . 0.2709
27. Jjiiij 1 ca 0.2623
2H. Al ijt.-r ii 0.6071
29. Tun i bia 0.7297
30. Zamn 1 .» 0.7498
31 . Ma Icjyt; u 0. 7 798
32. Ko r i • u 0.8679
J 3. Chad 0.9890
34. (jt Ol.'Ct.' 1.0 3 70
35. I'Obt J l< 1 C.J 1.0955
3b. Ecil-idoi 1.2952
37. l;,rj u 1 1. 3849
38. Panama 1.4027
3
lJ. M.j 1 1 1 . 5900
40. Hjiit ) t .in 1 .1 3.6628
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Table 6
Countr> Factor Scores For Factor




I vory i \ iiisi -5.0761
2 M i 1 awi -4.8299
3. Uruguay -3.3891
4. Jama i cu -3.2372
5. Horn i n< .hi Repu blic -3. 1468
6. [nil id -3.0464
7. Sud,.n -2.6887
H . Gu.it tina 1 ,i -2. 1633
lJ. Kl .ialV.ul.il -2.0154
111. Ar ijent i rtj -1.8773
LI . Lt h l 0[ l a -1 .6182
12. Zamb i a -1 .2456
1 3. Ct.-n . At r l can Rep. -1.1247
14. I'ak i stari -1. 1750
15. U \ Cjet l a -0.9924
If.. IbJ at- I -0.9019
17. Co 1 omi - 1 a -0.8612
18. RWdlV la -0.5707
19. VV n*j ;iil-Li -0. 3128
20. C\\\ 1.: -0.0551
21 . Tun i .s i a 0. 3368
22. M.iur 1 t a ii l a 0. 3 3 70
2 J. A I qt.'t la 0. 3126
2-1. Spa in 0.4160
25. (ll.aaa 0.7502
26. l'a raquay 0.9798
27. I'a Main ( 1.09 7 7
2b. Kau tra 1. 2124
29. I'w: t i l<Ka 1.2232
30. Ma 1 1 1. 3 3 30
21 . Ma 1 ays i a 1. 150 2
3 2 . HcaIi O 1 .6052
33. Peru 1.6304
34. Chad 1.8443
35. '1 lull 1 an 1 2. 3142
36. 1 ni lent i-> i a 2.9950
37. Bo I 1 v l a 3.0814
3d. 1'h i 1 i pp i neb 3.7085




Country Factor Scores For Factor 6
External Debt Service 1982
1
.
I nd 1 d -2.4559
2 . Chad -2.2902
3. Pak 1st an -1.9948
4. Greece -1.8058
5. I'll i 1 1 [>[> 1 IH'S -1.4571
(>. Ma 1 1 -1 . 3548
7. Chi le -1. 1300
8. Main l t aii l a -1. 1084
9. Tha l 1 and -1.0292
in. Ghana -0.9413
1 1 . Rwanda -0.6823
12. i:l :,alvadOt -0.5749
1 J. Ecuador -0.5693
14. Sudan -0.5307
15. I iii loru.'t. i a -0.4979
16. B() 1 1 V 1 a -0.4772
1 7. ( Ilia t t iii.i 1 a -0.3995
18. Con . Af I 1 cm Kep . -0.2883
1'). Spj i n -0.1491
20. Tun i s i
a
-0.0993
21 . Col omi . i .. -0.0679
22 . [;,l ac 1 0.0199
2 3. bom i n i cjii Kopub 1 i c 0.1943
24. Zuml - i a 0.2192
25. KO! t'd 0.31 36
26. J a [Ha 1 ^.a 0. 3506
27. Ivory (\>a:,t 0.4902
2d. I'a L aijilay 0.5343
29. At >|< nt i na 0.6805
30. Panama 0.9209




33. Ma Kiw i 1. 1673
34. N i \ ) e r i a 1 .2527
35. Ma 1 ay b i
a
1.2931
3b. Uruguay 1. 3 708
37. ("oi.t a !•: led 1. 3722
3d. fei u 1 .691b
39. Abj.-r id 1 .8655
40. Mex i co 3. 1870
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Table 8
Country Factor Scores For Factor
Publ i c Ex ternal Debt 1970
1
.
r j i i j t t i.i -3.5895
2 _ I vory Coast -3.4609
3. Ma lawi -3.0665
4. Uruyuay -2.9409
5. Dominican Republic -2.9214
6. Mux l CO -1 .9600
7. On j t i-nu 1 a -1.8860
6. iltli iopi a -1.7558
9. S ii i i , n i -1 .6768
10. At qont l na -1 .4392
1 1 . Col omb i i -1.2397
1 2. Jama 1 ( a -1.2197
1 3. L. 1 Sulvadoi -1 .0996
14. Rwanda -0.9080
IS. S[ i i ii -0.8756
16. Kuin -0.5777
17. n.i lays id -0.4 251
18. I'jk i s;t an -0. 3813
19. r.» i a' |uay -0. 1949
20. '1 llli 1 i. 1 a -0.1760
21. Tlia i 1 and -0.0660
22. A 1
1
1 < t la -0.0576
2 3. Man t i tan i j -0.0104
2 4 . (Vn . A t t 1 > an Kt.p
.
0.031b
J. 5 . V< Ii. ZIU 1 a . 3 7 2 2
2b. I n.i la 0.4371
27. Chi U> 0.5263
28. I s« j c>l 0.5859
29. i ; liana 0.6319
30. Cost a Ki i*j 0.9238
31 . Ot u 1.2437
32. I ndones i
a
1.4230
3 3. Panama 1 .4872
34. i. Had 2.2261
35. Ph i 1 ippi nc-s 2. 3347
36. Bol LVUi 2.599 3
37. .'. imb i a 2. 7008
3H. Ma ] i 4.4498
3
lJ. > it < • t - C i
•
4.5781
40. bVuadc )t 6.494 3
52
Tables 2 through 3 which -factors may be of more significance
in determining the level of mil i tary expenditures for
'v'enezue 1 a .
M i c h ae 1 '' Lear y an d W i 1 1 i am Cop 1 i n indicated in a
previous study that gross national product may be the best
var i ab 1 e to use when a 1 1 ernp t i n g t o e
x
plain p a 1 1 e r n s of
mil i tary expenditures CRe-f: 26]. They -found a correlation
coe-f -f i c i en t of . 88 between mil i tary expenditures and gross
national product -for a sample o-f 1? Latin American countries
-for the period of 1967 to 1971.
By including total mil i tary expenditures and gross
domestic product as variables in the factor analysis. Table ?
y i e 1 de d some interesting but n on c on c 1 u s i v e figures. Bo t h
v ar i ab 1 e s , total m i 1 i t ar y e x p e n d i t u r e s an d gr oss dome s t i c
product, loaded highest on factor 3, the level on
i n t e r n a t i on a 1 re se r v e s . Men e z u e 1 a a 1 so loaded highest on
factor 3, as shown on Table 4. There does not appear to be
an y d i rect c or r e 1 at i on f or- t h e o t h e r s i x f ac t or- s .
O'Leary and Cop 1 i n also noted that other measures, such
as mi 1 i tary expend i tures as a share of gross national
product, might be a more appropiate measure of the link
between economic variables and mil i tary expenditures CRef .
26] .
Replacing total mil i tary expend i tures wi th mi 1 i tary
e x p e n d i tures a s a s h a r e of g r o s s domest i c p r o due t h ow e u e r d i
d
n o t s i gn i f i c an 1 1 y i mp r ov e the fact or 1 oad i n g as sh own i n
53
Table ?
Oblique Rotated Factor Pattern: Economic Variables,
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Table 10. In any case, Table 10 does not indicate a clear-
pattern of military- e x penditures as a m a j or trend in the
data.
The p o o r c o r r e 1 a t i o n s of m i 1 i t a r- y e x p e n d i t u r e s o n the
e c o n om i c trends in the data could be a result of one o r b o t h
of two hypo the si ses: ( 1 ) pol i ti cal and soc i al war i abl es
account for most of the observed patterns of mil i tary
spending between countries; (2) the sample of countries is
not a homogenous set with regard to underlying economic and
mi 1 i tary expend i ture 1 i nkage
.
A test of whether pol itical and social variables were
mor e p r om i n e n 1 1 y correlated to mi 1 i tar- y e x p e n d i tures was
c on du c t e d using fact or an a 1 y s i s . The i mp u t y ar i abl e s we r e
selected from the Yale data set CRef. 23]. The results
sh owe d y e r y little correlation be twee n the uar i ab 1 e s
,
d i sp r ov i n g this h yp o t h e s i s
.
With re gar d t o the se c on d h y p o t h e s i s
,
p r e \> i ou s s t ud i e s
h av e stated that de v e 1 op i n g countries may 1 ac k h omoge n e i t
>
with respect to the decision making process for levels of
defense e x p e n d i t u r e s a n d their i m p ac t o n the o v e r a 1 1 e c o n om i
gr ow t h of the count r y . Freder i k sen an d Loon e y c on tend that
under certain circumstances defense spending can help the
economic growth of a country while under a different set of
circumstances it may hinder economic growth. Both
proposi t i on s are 1 i kel y to be true for- the same country at
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Frederiksen and Looney state the crucial determinant of
the impact of defense expenditures on economic growth is the
country's financial resource c o n s t r a i n t s . According to them
a c ou n t r y that is se v e r e 1 y r e sou r c e c on s t r a i ne d w ill p r obab 1 y
cut higher growth development programs from their budget in
order to maintain defense programs. They also contend the
opposite is 1 ikely for countries with a relative abundance of




gh growth deve 1 opmen t programs wh i 1 e ma i n tai n i ng or even
increasing defense p r o g r am s
.
B . D I SCR I M I NANT ANALY S I
S
B a s e d on the a b o v e and the lack of determinanc y in the
country factor scores, it makes sense to sp 1 it the sample of
developing countries into groups based on some measure of
resource c on s t r a i n t . Ne asu r e s of de b t an d c ap i t a 1 f 1 ow f r om
Tab 1 e 1 we r e u se d to perform a discriminant an a 1 ys i s
.
k.'ar i ab 1 e s with the highest loading in e ac h of the i n d i v i du a 1
f a c tor- s were used.
The results of the discriminant analysis on Table 11 show
a high degree of probabil i tv of correct placement in each
group. The discriminant analysis was able to sp 1 it the
country sample into two distinct groups based largely on the
external debt facing each country. Venezuela is in group II
a 1 on g w i t h se v e r a 1 o t her ma.j or oil e x p or t e r s . Gr ou p I
Table 11
Discriminant Analysis Total Sample Countries
Based On Economic Factor Analysis High Loadings
Group I Group II
Count ry
pr.ni, .,b, i iry
ol i nrr^v
t
PI ice rrt nf Count ry
Pcob ihi 1 i ry
of Current'
PI acerrenk
I. Israel fcj. 14 1 . Greece 57.7b
2. Honduras 83. -IB 2. India 84.91
3. Canu.-roon bO. 1 ) 1. Nuieria 80.07
4. Sudan bl>. 4 7 4. Indonesia 90. b7
5. Cos l j Rica '•2.64 5. tiypt 6H. 20
6. Bolivia H6.2 7 6. Korea 8-J.05
7
.
Soma 1 i a ll.,.4.> 7. Rw.m.la 60. OS
rl
. Tunisia i,a . ii B. Tui key fab. 95
9. Morocco 7 1.no . Spain 51 .80
I . Gual t.-ma 1 a 5 4 . o i 10. Venezuela Bo. 2b
11. Malawi 91 . 4o 1 1 . Mex leo 90. €9
12. tl Salvador 65. SO 12. brazi 1 90.02
11. Mill •J 7 . 1 2 11. Alger i
a
7h. 44
14. I'.ikiiUn Hb.'ul 14. Pb i 1 ippi ries 55. 78
15. Paraguay ml. 1)2 15. Libya 75. b0
lb. 1. ua.lur 5b. ol lb. Colombia 54.63
17. Dominican Republic 74. 1 2 1 7. Tha i land 60.05
IB. 1 il.i t ia )1. 7 7 IB. Malayasia b5. lb
19. Ivory ''oust 8 4.42 19 . Ar.|ent ina fab.U9
20 . Ma u r u an 1 a 00.0-1 2(1. Saudi Arabia h 4 . 1 5
21. Sierra 1 rone Hb.o5 21. Kuwait. 81.31
22. Panama 04. 3 7 22. Syria 6 1.05
23. Chile 70.00 23. Jordan 50.81
24. Chad B7. IB
25. Uruguay 67.87
2G. Taii-'.inia /0.U7
27. Ui|.lilJa MB. ?.,
2». Etlnopia 70. z4
20. Cell. African Hep. 7b. 8')
10. Ghana V8.72
11
. [liu ma o2.il
12. Sr l 1 jiikj 75. P>
) 1 . J.inu 1 1 a so
. bf>
14. Trinidad 77. o2
15. Zambia 05
. Hd





c o u n t r i e s s e em t o be the p oorer, 1 e s s e c o n om i c a 1 1 y d y n E*.rri i c
nat i o n s
.
Further insight in the prof i le of the two groups can be
gained by examining Table 12, the means of variables used in
the d i sc r i m i n an t an a 1 ys i s . Gr ou p II c ou n t r i e s sp end i .
5
times as much per gross domestic product on mil i tarv
e x p e n d i t u r e s a s d o g r o u p I c
o
untr i e s . M i 1 i tar- y e x p e n d i t u r e
s
per person in group II countries s.r^ 4 times that of group I
and total mill tarv expend i tures for group II are 7.5 times as
1 a r g e a s t h o s e f o r g r o up I .
G r o up II c o u n trie s a r e c o n s i de r a b 1 y 1 a r g e r , more
affluent, and less rel i an t on external debt, as a percentage
o f GNP , t h a n a r e g r o u p I c o u n t r i e s
.
C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Based on the profiles of groups I and II, one might
predict that the public external debt and external capital
f 1 ow h a y e p 1 a y e d a large r r o 1 e i n f a c i 1 i t a t i n g m i 1 i t a r y
expend i tures in group I . Venezuela and the remainder of the
g r o up II c o u n trie s m
a
y h a >> e a 1 t e r n a t i y e me a n s b y w h i c h
military e x p e n d i t u r e s c an be fin an c e d an d t h u s 1 e s s de p e n de n
t
o n external debt a n d c ap i t a 1 f 1 ow
.
'v
1 a r i o u s m e a s u r e s o f m i 1 i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s were u s e d t o
test this h y p o t h e s i s . They are: < 1 ) total mill tar y
e x p e n d i t u r e s ; ( 2 ) m i 1 I t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s a s a p r o p o r t i o n o f
g r o s s n a t i o n a 1 p r o d u c t ; < 3 > mil it a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s p e r c a p i t a
;
Table 12
Means Of Discriminant Analysis Variables
Total iroup >oup















F.CI8F. = Gross Inflow of Public Lo»ns 19"2 Divided by Fxports 19*2
PCB = External Public Debt 19^2
GIRB = Gross International Reserves 1012
PDPB = External Public Debt as a Percent*?* of Gross Domestic Product 19"?
ZB = Average Annual Growth In Imports 1970-02
DSFB = Debt Service is a Percentage of Fxoorts 1 0«2
PDPA * External Public Debt as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product 1970
MF.y * Military Expenditure as a Percentage of Gross National Product 19°1
GNPPF3 Per Capita Gross National Product 1 °q2
HEP = Military Expenditure Per Capita 1 '<M
GEDB Defense h xpoodl t ures as a Percentage of Total Government Expenditure
ME Total Military Expenditure 1 0*s|
0.70 0.* 0.26
"5012.00 2629.30 117«6.qn
25n?.?0 S°3.*0 6l 1«.»0
15.10 U^.30 19.20
a. io 1.09 9. SO
l't.10 IS. 00 12.50





131°. 10 3Q 9.10 29U3.90
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and (4) mi 1 i tary expend i tunes as -a percentage of the
government budget. These were -first analyzed by factor
analysis and then by regress i on an a 1 ys i s
.
The -Factor a n a 1 y = is sen v e d to s h ow h ow group I and gro u
p
I I c ou n t r i e s d i -f f e r e d f r om e ac h o t h e r an d h ow the y d i f f e r
from the total sample o-f countries in terms o-f the loading o-f
the various measures o-f mil i tary expenditures on the economic
-fact or s . Th e re gr e s s i on anal ys i s was pert orme d to ob t a i n a
mor e accurate dep i c t i on an d quantification of the e c on omm i c
variables most responsible tor the observed difference in
mi 1 i tar y e x pen d i t u re s be twe e n c ou n t r i e s
.
Gross domestic product, gross national product per capita
and a measure of mil i tary expend i tures were added to the
v ar i a b 1 e s f r om Table 1 for the fact o r a n a 1 ysis. The fir s
t
measure of mi 1 i tary expend i ture examined was total mi 1 i tary
expenditures. The results showed that the separate groups of
c ou n t r i e s p o i n t to different v ar i ab 1 e s be i n g associated w i t h
total mili tary expend i tures than does the total country
s ampie.
The total country sample in Table 13 loads highest on
factor 3. This indicates that gross national product per
capita and international reserves play a large role in
affecting mili tary expend i tures. The group I countries load
highest on factor 1 , This indicates group I countries have a
strong association between mili tary expend i tures and publ ic
external debt. Group II countries on Table 15 loaded highest
61
Table 13
Oblique Rotated Factor Pattern: Economic Uariables,
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Table 14
Oblique Rotated Factor Patterns: Economic Variables,
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Oblique Rotated Factor Pattern: Economic Variables,
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on factors 4 and 6. This indicates that the group II
countries have a more diverse pattern of economic variables
that affect mi 1 i tary expend i tures.
The number of variables for regression analysis was
expanded to include the results of the factor analysis.
Variables that reflected the main factors upon which mi 1 i tary
expend i tures loaded heavi ly on were added to the data set.
A step wise regression for the total country sample.
Table 16, indicated that the order of importance of variables
affecting total mil i tary expenditures was: (1) the share of
mi 1 i tary expend i ture for 1981 in the total government budget
(GEBD); <2> the gross domestic product CGDF'B; (3) the publ ic
external debt in 1970 (PDA); (4) the gross domestic product
per capita CGNPPER). The debt service as a percentage of
exports in 1982 (DSEED was also significant but had a
negat i ve s i gn
.
The best equation on Table 16 for estimating mil i tary
expenditures was number 9. This equation was expected to
explain 79 percent of the fluctuations in mil i tary
e x p e n d i t u r e s . A c omp ar i son of ac t u a 1 v a 1 u e s v e r su s predicted
values, using equation number 9 from Table 16, is shown in
Table 17. Only one country, the Phil ippines, had a predicted
value wi thin 5 percent of the actual level of i ts mi 1 i tary
expend i ture . Ve n e z u e 1 a ' s p r e d i c t e d v a 1 u e was 25 percent
b e 1 ow its actual 1 e v e 1 .
Table 16
Determinants 0-f Military Expenditures,
Total Country Sample, Economic Variables
(Standardized Estimates)
1 ME81=0 .46 0,,47 0,,33
(4 .88) (3 .97) (2,.84)
2 0..47 .46 0,.31
(4 .87) (3 .79) (2 .54)
3 .46 .72 .40
Independent Variables Statistics
Equa t i on
GEDB GDPB PDA POP PBCB GNPPER ECNIA PDB DSEB r 2 F DF
.704 30.91 42
0.06
<0.55> .706 22.85 42
-0.37
(5.28) (5.09) (3.63) (-2.78) .754 29.13 42
.46 .62 0.46 -0.33 0.18
<5.70) (4.44) (4.17) (-2.57) (2.35) .789 27.00 41
0.47 0.40 0.40 0.21
(5.13) (3.83) (3.46) (2.58) .750 27.84 41
0.47 0.50 0.43 -0.13
(4.86) (3.81) (2.19) (-0.61) .706 22.90 42
0.45 0.71 0.39 -0.50 0.67
(5.14) (4.91) (3.27) (-1.52) (0.41) .755 22.83 42
0.47 0.50 0.33 -0.17
(5.09) (4.31) (2.94) (-2.0) .732 25.29 41
0.46 0.61 0.44 -0.45 0.13 -0.18
(5.56) (4.27) (3.86) (-1.42) < . 42) ( -2 . 29) . 790 22.01 41
Notes: See text tor definition o + variables
( ) = t stat i stic
r*- = correlation coefficient
F = F stat i st i c
DF = degrees of -freedom
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Table 17
Total Military Expenditures , Total Country Sample




2. Rwanda 21 251 .524
3. Senegal 55 426.875
4. Bo 1 i v i a 196 1 187
3. L i ber i a 36 207.245
6. Par aguay 78 425.798
7. El Sal yidor 1 16 556.246
8. Burma 204 812.653
9. Trim dad 42 162.577
10. Ghana 141 317.939
1 1 . Z imbab 419 795.108
12. Dom i n i can Rep
.
104 183.831




15. Ecuador 296 453.439
16. Kuuia l t 1254 1876
17. Sudan 289 417.592
18. Mexico 1 196 1713
19. Jordon 874 1213
20. Tun i s i
a
228 261 .472
21 . Chi le 1 175 1331
22. India 5151 5787
23. Kenya 198 222.328





26. Syr i a 2437 2252
27. Tha i 1 and 1335 1089
28. Uenezue 1 a 1059 842.796
29. Spa i n 3655 2817
30. I sr ae 1 4374 3242
31 . Korea 4157 2943
32. Car 14 9.285
33. Morocco 1080 698.584
34. Argen t i na 3186 1921
35. I ndones i
a
2867 161 1
36. Peru 1026 569.440
37. Mai ays i a 1446 536.720
Actual/
Predicted PI acemen t
.0558 Be 1 ouj
.0835 Be 1 ouj
. 1288 Below
.1651 Be 1 ouj
.1737 Be 1 ow
.1832 Be 1 ow
.2085 Be 1 ow
.2510 Be 1 ow
.2583 Be 1 ow
.4435 Be 1 ow
.5270 Be 1 ow
.5657 Be 1 ow
.6012 Be 1 ow
.6196 Be 1 ow
.6528 Be 1 ow
.6684 Be 1 ow
.6921 Be 1 ow
.6982 Be 1 ow
.7205 Be 1 ow
.8720 Be 1 ow
.8828 Be 1 ow
.8901 Be 1 ow






















. 45PDA - 0.33PBCB
(5.70) (4.44) (4.17) (-2.57)
Countries whose Actual is less than 95"/.




10 5'/. oi Predicted value
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A step wise regression for the group I countries. Table
IS, indicated that the order of importance of variables
affecting total mil i tary expenditures was: (1) the publ ic
debt in 1982 (PDB); <2) the population for 1982 (POP); (3)
the share of mi 1 i tary expend i ture for 1931 in the total
government budget (6EDB); and <4) the net flow of external
loans in 1970 (ECNIA). As with the total country sample, the
d i't service as a percentage of exports in 1 932 (DSEB) was
statistically significant and n e ga t i u e . The best equation on
Table IS for estimating mil i tary expenditures was number 7.
This equation was expected to explain 94.5 percent of the
fluctuations in military expenditures. As might be expected,
the public debt in 1 9S2 (PDB) had the highest correlation
wi th total mi 1 i tary expend i tures. PDB was not statistical ly
significant in the total countr y s amipie. Interestingly the
publ i c debt in 1 970 ( PDA) , wh i ch was i mpor tan t i n exp 1 a i n i ng
the pattern of mi 1 i tary expend i tures for the total country
samp 1 e , is not statistically significant f or gr ou p I
countries when the regression equation includes population
(. POP ) an d net external capital i n f 1 ows f or 1 970 ( ECN I A ) .
Regression equations for group II countries, Table 19, as
wi th the two previous groups produced a posi t i ve and
statistically significant r e 1 a t i on ship w i t h the share of
mill tary expend i tures for 1981 in the total government
budget. The order of importance of variables affecting total
mill tary expend i tures was: (1) the gross domestic product
68
Table IS
Determinants Of" Military Expenditures,




GEDB PDB GDPB PDA POP ECNIA DSEB GIRBY r 2 F DF
1 ME=81 0.25 0.77
(2.9?) <8.29) .862 77.78 27
2 0.27 0.72 0.09
(3.16) (7.58) (1.14) .868 52.92 27
3 0.24 0.49 -0.07 0.54
(3.13) (4.19) (-0.77) (3.14) .909 44.36 27
4 0.25 0.49 0.47 0.28
(3.34) (4.22) (3.25) (2.90) .907 56.92 27
5 0.20 0.36 0.26 0.60
(2.96) (3.01) (3.29) (4.14) .922 68.44 27
6 0.20 0.36 0.05 0.27 0.55
(2.88) (2.96) (0.22) (3.00) (2.09) .923 52.15 27
7 0.22 0.56 0.27 0.45 -0.19
(3.69) (4.50) (4.00) (3.36) (-3.01) .945 72.91 26
8 0.22 0.38 0.36 0.53 0.17
(3.43) (3.36) (4.15) (3.83) (2. 17). 936 64.55 27
Notes: See text -for definition of variables
( ) = t stat i st ic
r* = correlation coefficient
F = F stat i st i
c
DF = degrees of freedom
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Table 1?
Determinants Of Military Expenditures,




GEDB GDPB PDA PDB POP PBCB ECIBE ECIB r 2 F DF
1 ME31 = 0.67 .76
(2.35) (3.21) .507 6.18 14
2 0.52 0.33 0.51 -0.61
(2.57) (2.90) (2.38) (-2.41) .736 6.98 14
3 0.48 1.12 3.39 -1.90 -2.48
(3.70) (5.61) (4.49) (-5.13) (-3.88) .901 16.45 14
4 0.43 0.91 2.73 -1.44 -1.86 -0.25
(3.95) (4.93) (4.05) (-4.04) (-3.17) (-2.35) .941 21.55 14
5 0.49 0.91 3.06 -1.46 -2.18 -0.29
(4.71) (5.04) (4.96) (-4.24) (-4.12) <-2.44) .944 22.32 14
6 0.51 1.05 3.39 -2.49 -2.38 -0.26 0.79
(6.06) (6.67) (6.54) (-4.77) (-5.49) ( -2 . 72) ( 2 . 31 ) . 968 30.40 14
Notes: See text for definition of variables
( ) = t stat i st ic
r 2 = correlation coefficient
F = F stat i st i
c
DF = degrees of freedom
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(GDPB); (2) the public external debt in 1970 (PDA); (3) the
share o-f mi 1 i tary expend i tures -for 1981 in the total
qouerrnment budget. In sharp contrast to group I countries,
the public debt in 1 982 ( PDB) is hi gh 1 y s i gn i t i can t bu t is
negative -for group II countries as is the population (POP)
and public exter n a 1 bor r ow i n g c omm i tme n t s in 1932 ( PBCB )
.
Group II countries present a picture o-f countries that
borrowed heav i \y in the early 1970s in order to taci 1 i tate
mi 1 i tar y e x pendi tures, but -f o r one r e a s o n or another c e a s e
d
this pattern toward the end o-f the 1970s and early 1930s.
Group I countries however appear to have used external
capital in -flows toward the end o-f the 1970s and the early
1930s as a means of increasing the amount o-f -funds allocated
-f or mi 1 i tar y sp end i n g .
The best equation on Table 19 for estimating mil i tary
expenditures was number 6. This equation was expected to
explain 96.8 percent o-f t h e -flu c u a t i o n s in m i 1 i t a r y
expenditures. A c omp ar i son o-f ac t u a 1 v a l u e s v e r su s pre d i c t ed
values, using equation number 6, is shown in Table 20.
k)e nezuel a ' s p r e d i c t e d v a 1 u e was w i thin one halt o-f on
e
percent o-f the actual value.
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Table 20
Comparison Of Actual Ms. Predicted Values o+ Total
M i 1 i tar y Expenditures, Group II Coun tries








4. Syr i a 2437 2755
5. Jordan 874 955
6. India 5151 5220
7. Spa i n 3655 3670
8. Braz i 1 1837 1844
9. Uenezue 1 a 105? 1048
10. Korea 4157 5023
1 1 . I ndones i
a
2867 2706
12. Ar gen t i n a 3186 2018
13. Th a i 1 and 1355 106?





























Based on regression equation:
ME31=0.52GEDB 1.04GDP + 3.3PDA -
(6.13) (6.68) (6.49)
Below = Countries whose Actual is
Above Countries whose Actual is
1.98PDB - 2.38P0P - 0.29ECIBE +
(-5.57) (-5.49) (-3.04)
less than 95X of Predicted value




In summary the basic regression equation for total
mi 1 i tary expend i tures shows the fol lowing d i fferences b;
samp 1 e group :
GEDB PDB PDA POP GDPB GNPPER
Total +
Group I + +
Group I I + -
+ +
+
Figure 11 - Summary Of Regression Equation For Total
Mi 1 i tar y S p e n d i n
g
Notes : + = Statistically Significant U i t h A Pos i t i v
e
Sign At The 95/.' Level
- = Statistically S i gn i f i c an t W i t h A Ne ga t i v
Sign At The 95/'. L e y e 1
= Statistically Insignificant
The results, therefore, lend support to the idea of
testing development countries as groups based on a common
economic environment rather than as a total sample.
The second measure of mi 1 i tary expend i ture examined was
mi 1 i tary expend i ture per capita, the resul ts of which
c on f i rme d the splitting of the developing c ou ntr ies into two
g r o u p s base d o n c ommo n economic e n v i r o nm e n t . A -factor-
anal y s i s of the total c
o
untr y samm p 1 e s h ow e d that mi 1 i tar
y
e x p e n d i t u r e s per capita 1 o a d e d o n
1
y m o d e r a t e 1 y o n one f a c t o
r
on Table 21. This was f a c t o r 7 , public e x t e r n a 1 debt a s a
Table 21
Oblique Factor Pattern: Economic Variables, Military
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percentage ot gross domestic product in 1970. In sharp
contrast, a factor analysis of group I countries show very
high loadings in the factor 1 column for various measures of
external debt on Table 22. This resul t is very simi 1 ar to
the findings for total military expenditures. The factor-
analysis for group II countries. Table 23, loaded high on a
factor re
p




publ ic consumption. As in the examination of total mil i tary
expenditures, group I countries and group II countries load
highest on different economic factors with regard to measures
of m i 1 i t a r y e
x
penditures per c a p i t a
.
A step w i se regression f or- the total c ou n t r y samp 1 e
,
Table 24, indicated that three variables, the gross national
product per capita (GNPPER), the current account of the
balance of payments (CAB) and the share of publ ic consumption
in g r- o s s domest i c product f o r 1 ? S 2 ( P C B ) a c c o u n t f o r o v e r 8 3
percent of the fluctuations in mi 1 i tary expend i tures per
capi ta. UJh i le the overal 1 regression resul ts appear to be
sa t i sf ac t or y , the be s t re gr e ss ion e qua t i on , number 4 on Tab 1
e
2 5 , w a s able t o predict on 1 y o n e c o u n t r y " s m i 1 i t a r y
expenditures per capita w i t h i n 5 p e r cent o f the actual v a 1 u e
as sh own in Table 26 . Ven e z u e 1 a '' s p r e d i c t e d >..< a 1 u e was
c on s i de r ab 1 y higher than it s ac t u a 1 u a 1 u e
.
The results for group I countries. Table 25, again show a
p a 1 1 e r n much different than t h a t o b t a i n e d f r om the total
sample. In addition to gross national product per capita,
Table 22
Oblique Factor Pattern: Economic Variables, Military
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Table 23
Oblique Factor Pattern: Economic Variables, Military
Expenditure Per Capita, Group II Countries
Factors
I 2 3 4 5 6~
Var i ables
Determinant s Public Determinants Growth Public
,
Growth
Of" External External of Military in_ External in
Debt I9R2 Borrowing Expenditure Public VHQk Exports













Interest Payments on Externa!
Public Debt 1982 100* -6 2
Gtoss Inflow Public Loans 1982 100* 2
Total Public External Debt 1982 94* -1 3
public External Borrowing Commit-
metns 1982 93* 2 -3
Repayment of Principal on Public
External Debt 1970 76* 3 -4
Interest Payments on External Public
Debt 1970 69* 3 -14
Repayment of Principal on Public
External Debt 1982 69* -13 35
Debt Service on External Debt as %
Exports 1982 69* 9 30
Resource Balance % GDP 1982 58* -35 9
Current Account Balance 1970 -88* -4 11
Public External Borrowing Commit-
ments/Exports 1982 82* -21 -1 1 -15
Average Maturity Public External Debt
l')82 -42 77* -8
Public External Debt/Exports 1982 27 69* -1
Gross Inflow Public Loins/Exp.irts 1982 51 '56* 8
Terms of Trade 1982 43 -51* 2
Gtoss Domestic Product 1982 45 -59* -48
GNP Per Capita 1982 3 -71* 18
Gross International Reserves 1982 -32 -73* -13
Gross International Reserves 1970 -77* -16
Put) lie Consumption as % GDP 1960 -26 -8 30*
Public External Debt % GDP 1970 47 ifi 77*
Exports » GDP 1982 1 -?) 68*
.t lut low Pub! ii External
I... ,,, ./i-.hP | IB 2 )H 21 66*
Put, lie Consumption *. GhP 1982 -14 6 60*
Military Expenditures Per Capita
19 81 -9 -3 1 5_7_*
Current Account Balance 1982 -23 44 48*
Private Consumption as % GDP L982 -21 20 -71*
Growth in Imports 1970-82 17 6 -13
Public Consumption Growth 1970-82 -2 35
Private Consumption Growth 1970-82 14 -12 37
Hit Inflow Public External Loans 1970 20 1
Total Public External Loans 19'0 19 6 -18
Public External Debt % GDP 1970 8 11 35
Gross Inflow Public External Loans
1970 52 2 -2
Growth in Exports 1960-70 -7 -6 24
Growth in Exports 1970-82 21 -7 20





























Determinants Of Military Expenditures Per Capita,




GNPPER CAB PCB ECNIA PDPB EGB GDPB GEDB GDB PDB r 2 F DF
1 0.32 0.75
(4.42X10.15) .730 67.84 52
2 0.2? 0.75 0.21
(4.60X12.06X3.41) .834 72.12 46
3 0.28 0.79 0.22 0.19
(4.98X13.82X3.84X3.38) .86? 70.06 46
4 0.23 0.76 0.31 0.17 -0.14
<3. 94X13. 47X4. 39X3. 21 X-2. 06) .882 61.22 46
5 0.26 0.77 0.29 0.14 -0.12 0.12
(4. 52X 14. 27X4. 40X2.66X-1 .86X2.2?) .8?6 57.1? 46
6 0.28 0.78 0.22 0.17 0.03
(4.78X 12.20) (3.23) (2.41
)
(0.43) .870 55.08 46
7 0.63 0.2? 0.33
(7.71) (3.0?) (3.66) .787 40.83 36
8 0.83 0.30 -0.28
(4.91) (2.56) (-1.66) .6?7 27.71 3?
? 0.28 0.78 0.22 0.13
(4.67X 12.71 X3.6?) (2. 11). 850 5?. 51 46
10 0.22 0.75 0.33 -0.17 0.12
(3.61 )( 12.51 ) (4.43) (-2.26) (2. 13). 866 53.36 46
Notes: See text -for definition ot variables
( ) = t stat i st i
c
r^ = correlation coe-f 4 i c i en t
F = F stat i st ic
DF = degrees oi -freedom
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Table 25
Military Expenditures Per Capita, Total Country Sample








4. Jama i ca 14. 348
5. Panama 13. 500
6. Kenya 1 1 . 579
7. Indones i a 18. 581
8. Mai au> i 5. 968
9. Liberia 18. 000
10. E th i op i a 13. 600
11 . Iwory Coast 13. 253
12. Mex i co 16. 634
13. 2 i mbab 53. 038
14. Maur i t i us 37.,333
15. El Salvador 25.,217






18. Tun i s i 34,,030
19. Uenezue 1 a 62,,663
20. Chi 1 e 104 .91 1




23. Saudi Ar abi
a
21 10 .000
24. Jordon 273 . 125
25. Greece 265 .773
26. Korea 103 . 666
27. Mai ays i
a
101 .1 19
28. Uruguay 125 .172
29. Th a i I and 27 .413
30. Peru 53 .717
31 . I Sir ae
1
1 151 .000
32. Bol i v i a 35 .000
33. Spa i n 96 .693





































Predi c ted PI acemen t
.0349 Be 1 ow
.0373 Be 1 ow
.0786 Be 1 ow
.0806 Be 1 ow
.0975 Be 1 ow
.1209 Be 1 ow
.1305 Be 1 ow
. 1384 Be I ow
.
1440 Be 1 ow
.1672 Bel ow
.2107 Be 1 ow
.2484 Be 1 ow
.3559 Be 1 ow
.3574 Be 1 ow
.3806 Be 1 ow
.3887 Be 1 ow
.3965 Be 1 ow
.487J Be 1 ow
.5278 Be 1 ow
.7559 Be 1 ow
.7723 Be 1 ow
.3462 Be 1 ow
1 .0404














Be 1 ow =
Above
regression equation:
.23GNPPER 0.77CAB * 0.31PCB 0.18ECNIA - . 1 5PDPB
(3.21) (13.47) (4.39) (3.21) (2.06)
Countries whose Actual is less than 95/. of Predicted value
Countries whose Actual is greater than 105*/: of Predicted value
79
Table 26
Determinants Of Military Expenditures Per Capita,




GNPPER GDB PCB GEDB ECNIA PDB ECNIB CAB PBCB GDP r2 f DF
1 0.54
(3.63) .291 13.14 33
2 0.58 -0.46
C4.22X-3.39) .505 13.28 28
3 0.74 -0.24 0.09
(6.43X-2.93X0.64) .782 26.34 25
4 0.56 -0.44 0.46
(5.99X-4.65) <4.37) .807 30.75 25
5 0.38 -0.30 0.32 0.40
(4.39) (-3.44) (3.74X3.77) .885 40.64 25
6 0.45 -0.31 0.37 0.29
(4.63X-3. 10) (3.94) (2.45) .850 29.82 25








Notes: See text -for definition of variables
( ) = t stat i st i
c
r ^ = correlation coefficient
F = F stat i stic
DF = degrees of freedom
, 48 -0.13
4 .0?) (-1 .64) .896
-0.38
34,.56 25
(-2.64) .424 1 1 .05 32
.67 -0.04
4 .67) (-0.35) .788
0.28
22 .32 28
(2.11) .580 1 1 .52 28
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the government deficit as a percent a. g e o f g r o s s dom e s t i c
product in 1982 ( GDB > is hi gh 1 y significant, bu t negative.
The share of mil i tary expenditures in the total government
bu dge t < GEDB ) is a 1 so s t a t i s t i c a 1 1 y s
i
gn i f i c an t w i t h a
post i tve sign as is the net flow of external loans in 1970.
Group II countries again indicate a pattern different
than that of group I countries. The results of the
regression for group II countries, Table 27, show that gross
dome s t i c p r odu c t per c ap i t a ( GNPPER ) and the c u r rent ac c oun
t
of the balance of payment <CAB) account for the major i ty of
the flu c u a t i o n s in m i 1 i t a r y expenditures per capita. The
share of publ ic consumption in 1 9S2 was also statistically
significant. It i s interesting to note that all me asu r e s of
e x tern a 1 debt we r e statistical 1 y insignificant in ace ou n t i n
g
for f lucuations in mil i tary expenditures per capita. Group
II countries therefore appear to maintain a much stronger
b a 1 an c e o f p aym e n t s p o s i t i o n t h a n do g r o u p I c o u n t r i e s .
A c omp ar i son of the actual v e r su s the predicted v a 1 u e in
T a b 1 e 2 8 f o r the g r oup II c o u n t r i e s s h ow som e imp r o v em e n t
ou e r the result ob t a i n e d f r om the t o t a 1 count r y samp 1 e . Th
e
predicted value for k-'enezuela is, however, worse than it was
in the total count r y samp 1 e
.
I n s umm a r y , the b a s i c re g r e s s i o n e q u a t i o n for m i 1 i t a r y
e x p e n d i t u r e s p e r c a p i t a s h ow s the foil ow i n g differences b y




Determinants Of Military Expenditures Per Capita,




SNPPER CAB PCB PCB GEDB GDB ECNIA GDP r-2 F DF
1 MEP81= 0.21 0.90
<3.15) (13.35) .923 102.05 19
2 0.19 0.91 .08
(4.73) (22.30) (1.80) .979 215.33 17
3 0.19 0.91 0.07 -0.02
(4.48) (21.31) (1.53) (-0.38) .979 151.10 17
4 0.80 0.43 0.01
(8.37) (4.54) (0.11) .921 35.14 12
5 0.56 0.34 0.29
(3.17) (4.34) (2.74) .953 68.13 13
6 0.43 0.01 0.80
(4.54) (0.11X8. 37) .921 35.14 12
7 0.19 0.91 0.06 -0.03
(4.48) (21.82) (1.28) (-0.73) .979 156.26 17
8 0.190. 89 0.10 .04
(4.67) (19.34) (2.03) (0.95). 980 160.67 17
Notes: See text for definition of variables
( ) = t stat i st i
c
r* = correlation coefficient
F = F stat i st i c
DF = degrees of freedom
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Table 28
Military Expenditures Per Capita, Group II Countries
Coun try Ac tual Pr edi c ted
Actual/
Predi c ted PI acemen t
.0241 Bel ow
.1 143 Be 1 ow
.1247 Be 1 ow
.1261 Bel ow
.1505 Bel ow
.2003 Be 1 ow
.3179 Be 1 ow
.4138 Be 1 ow
.4806 Be 1 ow
.7260 Be 1 ow
.8733 Be 1 ow
.9606
.9827












6. Thai 1 and 27.413
7. Phi 1 ippi nes 16.792
8. Al geri a 91 .959
9. Venezuela 62.663
10. Spain 96.693
1 1 Argent i na 111.010
12. Kuwait 836.000
13. Korea 103.666












































on regression equation: MEP81= 0.21GNPPER + 0.91CAB
<3.15) (13.35)
Actual is less than 95X o-f Predicted value




GNPPER CAB PCB PDB 6DB GEDB PDA
Total
G r o u p I
Group I I
Figure 12 - Summary Of Regression Equation For Mi 1 i tary
Expenditures Per Capita
No t e = : + = Statistical! y S i gn i f i c an t U) i t h A Pos i t i y e
~
i gn At The 95'/. Ley el
t a t i s t i c a 1 1 y S i gn i f i c an t Ui i th A Ne ga t i y
e
i gn At The 95/i Level
= Statistical! y I n s i qn i f i c an t
The third measure of mi 1 i tary expend i ture examined was
mill tary expend i tures as a percentage of gross national
product. A -Factor analysis was run for the total country
sample, group I countries and then for the group II
countries. The resul ts of these were si mi 1 ar to those of the
P r e y i o u s tw o , in that there w a s a n i m p r o y em e n t in the
mi 1 i tar y e x p e n d i ture 1 oad i n g wh en the c ou n t r i e s we r e sp 1 i t
i n to two groups
.
The factor analysis for the total country sample, Table
29, 1 Daded moderately well on factor 2. This factor consists
o t p u b 1 i c c o n s um p t i o n a s a p e r c e n t a g e o f g r o s s d omest i
c
product and several other measures of publ ic external debt in
34
Table 2?
Oblique Rotated Factor Pattern: Economic Variables,
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1?82. The export position of the country was also an
important el erne n t c on t a i n e d in t h i s tact or
.
Group I countries, in Table 30, loaded much higher on
factor 1 which is comprised ot" several measures ot publ ic
external debt in bo t h 1 970 an d 1982. Th i s i s c on s i stent w i t h
the pre y i ou s two factor an a 1 y =. j •=. of gr ou p I countries.
The factor analysis for the group II countries. Table 31,
shows a real tively high loading in factors 3 and 6. Factor 3
contains several measures ot publ ic consumption as a
percentage ot gross domestic product together with several
measures of publ ic external debt in 1982. Factor 6 contains
se v e r a 1 measures o t the c ou n t r i e s p os i t i on in ex p or t s
.
A step wise regression for the total country sample.
Tab 1 e 32 , i n d i c a t e s t h a t ap p r ox i ma t e 1 y 60 percent ot the
f lucuations in mi 1 i tary expendi tures as a percentage of gross
n a t i on a 1 product c an be e x p 1 a i n e d by two v ar i ab 1 e s . The
variables are the share of publ ic consumption in gross
domestic product in 1982 <PCB) and the share of mi 1 i tary
expenditures in the total government budget (GEDB). Gross
domestic savings as a percentage of gross domestic product
t or 1982 ( GDSB ) i s a 1 so s t a t i s t i c a 1 1 y significant bu t w i th a
negative sign.
A c om par- i s o n o f a c t u a 1 v a 1 u e s v e r s u s predicted v a 1 u e
s
using equation 3 from Table 32 is shown in Table 33. While
Table 3 3 indicate s a n i m p r o v em e n t in the o v e r a 1 1 total
36
Table 30
Oblique Factor Pattern: Economic Variables, Military
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Table 31
Oblique Rotated Factor Pattern: Economic Variables,
Military Expenditures As '/. 0-f GNP , Group II Countries
Vdt labl.":
f^r'°f r f^r t0 F s f? ct ', f s Ct.iwth Public Groiff'-.-'in-j aFf- "' i V'l &'(•-* fln '' A", i Exlyrnal intot J I , E<l;Ti,.l Hili'iiy Put. lie PeiA Exp
fent'Mih 5^I- Cx(0rtS r^hH't^r s Consumption 1^0
Interest Piyinnnts on Fxt«rnal
(ir It 1982 jno« -6
Rtiws Inflow Public Loans 1"H2 10')" 2
Total Public txtern.it Di'ht I IB2 9>* -1 3
I ui li Fxternal Borrowinq Commitments
I
.-l? »2* 1 -11
F»f i m-nr of Prim 1 pa I on External
I ins I - , 75* 2 - 1
P.-ptym"tlt jf principal on txri'f n.il
I i ins I >H2 ' >' -12 14
Del ' S»ivi.-p k of Exports 1982 fiH* 9 2d
Inn ri'sf Payments on External Debt
I 'i 70 ft 7* 2 -11
c i • Hi lam •• 1 »H2 S8* --in 10
iuri.nl Ai-i-oiini Halan--e I97u -«R* -S 12
I'ul In Dorrnwui'j Commitments/Exports
|OR2 u 84' -22
ft -i i |.- Maturity of external lli-bt
I-H2 11 '"* -'
Public External bobt /Exports 1982 26 6<>* -1
Gn s. Inflow Public External Loans/
Fxpnrts l'»H2 SI (•('" 7
l-i ms .jf rra-le 11(12 12 -48* 1
Gross Domestic Fro-luct 1982 14 -58* -47
a ss National Product ppr 'MpiM
1 u-.i 1 -71* 13
Cross Intern it lonal d s-rv.-s 1'tH? -li -72* -11
,rr s International Heserves 1970 -I -79* -14
Pub I l Consumption % COP 19(,CI -:4 -8 7B*
Ph! I i Fxternal Debt » CUP 1982 48 24 78*
•
.( its at t '••tip 11R2 5 -25 70*
Gr. »«.; Ir.t low Publ ic Loans, (,1'P
1 l«2 iq 18 6<>«
Mili tary Fx| t-ml i tur es % Clir 1 981 -20 -9 ^_^ 68*
Pub I ic Consumption » GDP 19M2 -1' 4 57"
iiiir.-nr Account Rilance 198? -21 4S 47*
Private Consumpl ion is t GDP 1982 -29 22 -74*
Growth in Imports 1970-82 19 9 -14
dio.ih in Public Consumption 1970-82 3 7 3
Growth in Private Consumption 1970-82 IS -11 19
N«-t Inflow of Publir Fxternal Loans
1970 18 4 2
I tell Public Fxternal Debt 1970 17 8 -14
Public External Debt % COP 1970 fl 14 17
Gross Inflow Put, In- Loans 19 70 S.J 3
Growth in Export-; 1970-82 ?! -0 18
Growth in Exports 1960-70 -4 -7 20









20 18 - 1 4
11 -S - 11
16 28 9
21 IS -1 4

































Determinants Of Military Expenditures Per Gross National
Product, Total Country Sample, Economic Variables
(Standardized Estimates)
Iridepende n t Car i abl es St at i St ICS
Eq ua t i on
PC8 GEDB GDSB GNPPER GDB POB DSGB r2 F DF
1 MEY81 = 0.60
(5.09) .351 25. 97 48
2 0.68


















(0.17) .714 27 .56 36
6 .43 0.46 -0.24 0.09
(4.24) (4.61 (-2.55) ( 1 .02) .763 25 .76 36
7 .37 0.50 0.22 -0.24
(2.76) (4.60) ( 1 .25) (-1 .40) .732 21 . 14 35
8 0.45 0.43 -0.28 0.10 0.11
(4.36) (4.24) (-2.83) (1.15) ( 1 .20) .774 21 .19 36
9 0.27 .49 -0.25 .18
(2.20) (4.04) (-2.34) ( 1 .70) .671 16 .84 37
Notes: See text -for definition ot variables
( ) = t stat i st i
c
r^ = correlation coefficient
F = F stat i st i
DF = degrees of freedom
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Table 33
Military Expenditures Per Gross Nat ion a
Product, Total Country Sample
Coun try Ac tual
1
.
Ivory Coast 1 .330
2. Senegal 2.261
3. Rwanda 1 .657
4. PaK i st an 5.836






9. El Salvador 3.323
10. Kenya 3.056
1 1 . Korea 6.677
12. Argent i na 2.646
13. Chi 1 e 3.716
14. Par aguay 1 .395
15. Morocco 7.152
16. Tha i 1 and 3.81 1




19. Uruguay 3. 149
20. India 3.117
21 . Peru 4.787





25. Ph i 1 i pp i ne
s
2.209
26. Tun i s i
a
2.731
27. 2 i mbab 6.554
28. Israel 20.274
29. Mai aysi 6.023
30. Cost a Rica 0.5978
31 . I ndones i
a
3.476




34. Uene zue 1 a 1 .555
Pred i c ted
Actual/
Pred i c ted PI acemen t
.3533 Be 1 ow
.3553 Be 1 ow
.4214 Be 1 ow
.4780 Be 1 ow
.4840 Be 1 ow
.5067 Be 1 ow
.6396 Be 1 ow
.6399 Be 1 ow
.6456 Be 1 ow
.7606 Be 1 ow
.8045 Be 1 ow
.8277 Be 1 ow
.8367 Be 1 ow
.8417 Be 1 ow
.8903 Be 1 ow























































Based on regression equa t i on :MEY81= . 27PCB 0.49GEDB - . 25GDSB + . 1 8DSGB
(2.20) <4.04) (-2.35) (1.71)
Below = Countries whose Actual is less than 95V. of Predicted value
Above = Countries whose Actual is greater than 105% o-f Predicted value
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c ount r y samp 1 e , t h e predicted value tor- 'v'e n e z u e 1 a was q u i t e
low, less than 20 percent o-f the actual value.
A step wise regression for group I countries. Table 34,
indicate the y f ol 1 ow a s i m i 1 ar pattern to that obse r v e d in
the anal ys i s of total mil it ar y e x p e n d i tures an d m i ) i t ar y
e x p e n d i t u r e s per capita. These countries tend to re sor t t
o
public e x t e r n a 1 sou r c e s ( PDB ) and gov e r nme n t s deficit s ( GDB
)
tor the financing of mi 1 i tary expend i tures. The gross
domes t i c product per cap i ta (GNPPER) is al so statist icall y
si gn i f i cant wh i 1 e gross domes t i c sav i ngs as a percentage of
gross domestic product in 1982 is not. As with the other-
measures of mi 1 i tary expendi tures, there is a large
i mp r ov erne n t in the correlation coefficient f or gr ou p I
countr i e s o v e r that obtained in the total sample.
A step wise regression for group II countries. Table 35,
again differs from those in group I in that external debt and
gov er nmen t def i c i ts do not pi ay a. s i gn i f i can t role i n
measuring the amount of mi 1 i tary expendi tures as a percentage
of gross national product. The share of government
expendi tures in gross domestic product in 1981 (GETYB) and
the share of mi 1 i tary expendi tures in the total government
budget along w i t h g r o s s dom e s t i c s a v i n g s a s a p e r c e n t a g e o f
gross domestic product in 1 9S2 which has a negative sign,
ac c ou n t f or nearly 90 percent of the f 1 u c u a t i on s i n m i 1 i t ar
y
expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product.
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Table 34
Determinants Of Military Expenditures Per Gross National
Product, Group I Countries Economic Variables
(Standardized Estimates)
Independent Variables Statistics
Equa t i on




.423 21 .23 30




Notes: See text -for definition of variables
( ) = t stat i st i
c
r^ = correlation coefficient
F = F stat i st i
DF = degrees o-f freedom
, 42 0. 40 0. 28
(4,,50) <3,,81 ) (3,,21 )
,
44 0,,34 0,,32 -0.11
(4,,82) (2 .99) (3,,57) (-1 .45)
, , 19 0,,43 0,,34 -0 .26
<2 ,18) (5 .28) (4 .94) (-3.86)
.37 .33 .20 -0 .08 0.20
(4 .04) (3 .18) (2 .06) (-1 .25) (2.02)
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Table 35
Determinants Of Military Expenditures Per Gross National
Product, Group II Countries" Economic Variables
(Standardized Estimates)
Independent Variables Statistics
Equa t i on
GETYB GED8 GDSB 6NPPER r2 F 0F
1 MEY81= 0.62
(2.9?) .301 8.95 15
2 0.70





4 0.43 0.44 -0.54
(4.27) (4.16) (-5.03) .899 29.70 13
5 0.49 0.57 -0.03
(2.93) (3.32) (-0.20) .719 9.40 14
Notes: See text -for definition of variables
( ) = t stat i st i c
r^ = correlation coefficient
F = F stat i st i
c
DF = degrees of freedom
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A comparison of actus, values versus predicted values
using equation 4 from Table 35 is shown in Table 36. The
predicted value s s h ow a great impr o v eme n t o v e r those t o r the
t o t a 1 c ou n t r y samp 1 e w i t h Venezuela being w i t h i n 3 percent of
t h e a c t u a 1 v a 1 u e .
In summary the basic regression equation for mil i tary
expenditures as a percentage of gross national product shows
the foil ow i n g differences b y sampie group:
PCB GEDB GNPPER GDSB DSGB PDB GDB
Total +
Group I +
Group I I +
Figure 13 -
Notes: + =
Summary Of Regression Equation For Mil i tary
Expenditures As A Percentage Of Gross
Nat i onal Produc t
=
Statist
b i g n At
Stat i s t
S i gn At
S t a t i s t
c a 1 1 y Significant With A Pos i t i v
e
The 95/: Level
c a 1 1 y Significant With A Negative
The 95% L e v e
1
ca 1 1 y I ns i gn i f i can t
The fourth measure of mil i tary expend i ture examined wai
the share of mi 1
i
tary expendi tures in the total government
budget. This was analyzed using the total country sample.
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Tabl e 36
M j 1 i t ary Expenditures Per Gross Nat ional
Product, Group II Countries
Coun try Actual Predicted
Actual/
Predi c ted PI acemen t
.3491 Be 1 ou
.5955 Be 1 ow
.6726 Be 1 ow
.7626 Be 1 ow
.9021 Be 1 ow
.9270 Be 1 ow
.9289 Be 1 ow
























Ma 1 ays i
a
Argen t i na



















































Below = Countries whose Actual
Above = Countries whose Actual
on regression equation: MEY81= . 43GETYB - 0.55GDSB 0.44GEDB
<4.27) (-5.03) (4.16)
is less than 95/^ o-f Predicted value
is greater than 105X o-f Predicted value
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t'ol lowed by a simi I ar anal /sis of group I and group II
countr i e s
.
The factor results tor the total country sample. Table
3 7 , s h ow that this me a sure of m i 1 i t a r y e x pendi tures 1 o a d
s
fairly high on one factor, export growth. It however, has
little c or r e 1 a t i on w i t h other main t r en ds i n the da t a
.
The group I countries. Table 38, again load heavily on
factor 2, one which includes a number of debt variables.
These variables are the total external public debts in 1970
a n d i 9 8 2 , a n d s e v e r a 1 me a s u r e s of the i n f 1 ow of external
loans. The gross national product per capita is also
included in this factor.
The group II countries. Table 39, load heav i ly on factor
5. As with other measures of mil itary expenditures, this
f ac t or doe s n o t c on t a in debt variables. Factor 5 c on si s t s
m a i n 1 y of the effects of e x p o rt g r ow t h
.
A s t e p w is e r e g r e s s i o n f o r the total c o u n t r y sampie.
Table 40, indicated that p a 1 1 e r n s i n m i 1 i t a. r y expenditures in
the g o v e r nm e n t budget tend to be rathe r s t a b 1 e when t a K en a
s
a s h a re of the t o t a 1 g o v e r nm e n t budget, i.e. the share of
mill tary expend i tures in the total government budget for 1971
'• GEDA ) was hi gh 1 y s i gn i f i c an t in e x p 1 a i n i ng the 1 e v el of

















































Oblique Rotated Factor Pattern: Economic Variables,
'/. De-fense Expenditure In Total Government Budget,
Total Samp 1
e
Factors factors Foreign Factors D- r t Ciowtli in
F ii 1 1 1 t if l ng Inf I u. nci ng Reserves Influencing Fjtii Pri.it..
Pull i . Tot j I
,
Lit,"rna I S' ;J 'V "E 1982 Consumptionfuiis.iniLti.in rVbl 1982 Willi ,ir', (ii.ph.
Variables in '.v l . nugget
Gross Inflow 1'ublic l.ojns a *
of :[jP 19*32 99*
Resource B,il.lnrf as * of GPP
l'<8 2 91, • 1
Gross Inflow rublic Loans is t
of Exports l"82 9H* 14
Public Borrowing "ommi f nvnt s as %
of tx|,,rt; I iH2 98* 2
pui in- (.it as * of i«(..ti-, i'H.' 97* n
Growth in Public Consumption I Wn-n2 83* 6
Pol. lie Consuittpt ion as of Gl,P l''H2 82* -6
Public Consumption as » of GOP lufto 70* -13
Fxtornal Pubiir Debt as \ of '.IP
197(1 ft8* S
r. rim. nl Trili' I''H2 - '8* 21
I'l iv Hi' ' 'orifiumpt i on is * of hi
|-in,> -Hi- -13 -21 -5 -10 -9
Private Consumption as * of G[>p
I 16(1 -<*«• 10 -28 21 -7 -1
External Public l'i ht l'iH2 -1 9fl« -2 7 14
Intcro-.t Payments! on Ixtrm.il Public
lull l'i "I '< 94* 2 -12 -I -29
Pi.paymiiii ot l-r i ii. 1 1 1 1 tin I <t • i n.i 1
Publ n- Loans 1 =» 70 H 94*
Gross Inflow Public I uns 1 .'«2 -4 94'
Pubiir Hor rowing Commitments I ^82 -6 92*
.1.-'. Inflow Public Loans 1970 6 91*
Interest Payments on Public Debt
I9R2 -2 90*
Peg lymorit of Principal on Public
f.o.ti,s I 182 -3 8 ft*
I xl it n i I L'ibl ii Uebl 11 7n g 74.
Not Inflow Public External Loans
1 "o 4 7J .
Current Account Balance I97u 7 88*
Gross International Pesetas 1982 4 -9
Gioss International Peserves 197(1 5 4
Gross National Froduct Per Capita
I9H2 -1
-11
Gtoss Domestic Product 1982 1 50
Average Maturity of External Fublic
Di ht 1982 2 1 -10
Current Account Balance 1982 -2 -16
Peicrnt ot Oef"nse Fxpend 1 t ur es in
Total Gov ernin.-nt Expenditures 1981 - 7 8
Fxport Growtli I9ft0- '"0 -~4 -~[
Export Growth 1970-82
-21 25
Pill lie External Debt as » of
GIT I9B2 37 1
External r-ebt Service as * of GUP
i 'R2
-a 35
Exports as » of GUP 1982 7 -11
C,r wt h in Private Consumption 1970-82 21 4


























Oblique Factor Pattern: Economic Variables, /. Defense
Expenditures In Total Government Budget, Group I
Coun tries
V.w l ibl-s
1 2 J 4 5
3 tots factors Sfivi. inu Expert External
ai ll l > it i n-i lpFIu- ncin-i ExIitujI Position P'Jllii,




<;rn . I ill l"w I'uh I i' Loans .is » ot
r.l)V I'1R2 10il«
Put'lli B- rrrwmj <'omml tmcnt s ^s %
n| r.pp |<)R2 100*
Grol.s Inflow Public loans as *. of
r,[ r- I'jh; | on*
Publi I m t as * Exports 1982 9R*
r>"snur <? B.i I inre 1 )»)? 9S"
Grovti. in Public Consumption 1970-82 33*
- ! .1 ', in Import s l'»/U-H2 Bo*
Public fonsunpt ion .is * of GDP I9H2 77*
pul lii- fniiiumpf ion -is * of gup |T0 76*
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.i I nt <-i n ir i i i, 1 1 Pnservvs 19H2 4
ti. t Intl.' Puhl ii Extornal Loans I • ' 4
Grn' s National Product Per r.ipitu |'Jfl2 -10
Pi i ' nr of IW' n-.ii Expon'li t litis in
t il iiiivrrnni'iit f vp.n-1 1 I uro;. I^-I
_2
External l ubl n: i).-lit I'tio 9
I (tot n .1 Putil i<- Pet.r I "'2 -S
f.f.iV. lull' W I v| ,.,,,, I | ,, ,,,•. | '| /l| h
Gm-.s [nrnrniiinn.il Pi'srrvf* l'17'i 2
lnt.f-t Payments on External f.'lt ['>»? -1
Pi p iym**rit of F'r i n ipil on Puhl ic
Li in< 1 '•«: -I
i,i . I r . t I w I'uh I 1 1- Loans I "'H2 2
Gi . |i. — •,' i - I'ro'lu. t 19fi2 -6
Current A-.-c-oiiiit H.i lain-*? L9R2 -10
Cuerntit a -onnr B.il.ince 1970 in
H< | , . i. i r ot In ii' i(i i| ,,n Put' 1 ic
I 'ti'tm I I ..ins I 9 70 7
Int. rrsr Piympnts on Fxtern.il
Debt I ',70 7
,i -t|i of Private Consumption 1970-R2 46
Export s is * of Gt>p 1 132
Foil i External Debt as » of GDP l'>82 IR
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External I'eht [itrvirens % of Exports
1°P? -21
Puolic Fxtcrnal Borrowing Comnu tment s
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Growth in Exports 1970-82 -21





































4 -4 - 7 4
3 -1 -9 1
5 -9
- ! -7 -2
20 6 -1 -1
-6 12 1
-19 -4 13 17
-6 28 2 -6
-9 19 -22 -1
-9 1 1 -S - 16
- )2 -1 7 -1 7
-16 20 22 1 1
-4 a
6 -lfl -6 22
5 10 -S -9
-6 4 -12 1 1
-4 1 -16 I - 1
11 1 -2 -12
-1 1 8 37 -8
)S 10 - 1 4
26 -IS •I 1 1
4S 2
1 hn - 1
21 8 49
29 - 11 1« - 31







IS 8R* 16 18
4 R3* 16 t
-28 69* -
-1 7
22 1 S3* _ i
38 10 -26 42
29 1 1 -22 41
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Table 3?
Oblique Factor Pattern: Economic Variables, '/. Defense
Expenditures In Total Government Budget, Group II
Countr i es
i
EW-'tori liL-'crmin.ints Factors Crowth Factors
ln|lv a inj of bii .til Infl j. n in'j in Ipf Iu' II 'J I IV]
t il txt'-r- in Pi. III'. £'¥('•' '•* Imports 5t'Jto "t
nj| f.-lil r.iiisiiinif inn FuLll. Mll k ',lrv L*I enrCon-.umpt ion 1 n . v t . Iiui'jet
Exf-rn.il Public Oebt 19A2 99* 2 -5 7-4
Gross Inflow Public Loans 1^82 96* 5 A 18 -A
Interest r ayments on Fxtern.il
Public nob! 1 iA2 94* -1 11 10 -If.
Pi-i lymerit of Principal on PubliL
Olrrrnl 1.0.1ns l r"o >2' -II 2 2 1 -3
I 'if I 1 F/i"ni,il borrowing r mi'-
m. nt 1 in; •. • 12 -9 IS -M
P. [ .r/mi'iit >t pr mcipi I on I'm! I 1
External Loins 19*2 8 •' * -5 -1 -39 14
|)i-li| Service on Public lxi»irnl
C'.-i t as * of Exports 1982 84' -7 2A -18 -12
lut • r <• , r payments on External Public
(.. 1 1 1(70 H-l* -3 -1H -14 4
I--. Inflow I'llhlli l.o. ur, l ri '" ''• -39 -1 15
Ri.-.oui • R.ilanrp as » of .l>P I'tHl h'l" -SI -6 -IS I
Gtoss Inflow Public Loans as t
of Exports l"><2 • • 56 24 -29 -is
r.-rms I 7r,ll. I imJ hO* -4H -31 41 -16
Current Acouiir Ral.ince 1970 -AH* -7 11 -In -19
Pul-1 i r nor row 1 nq f jmmi tments is
» 1 Fx| it'. I'm,1 5 92* -6 -' -24
/wriii.' Mituriy of public External
l.i i I ih; - U 87*
. ur 1 .nt A ...mi 11 1 I in. i- I >h.> - lij An*
Avi'i 11- Annual Growth in Pill n
Con; uin( 1 ion I'l 70-82 - 7 / 1 •




Cr..-.s Inr i.-i 11 11 1 n.i 1 Ppsmvos 1982 -25 -71'
fim-.f Intern it 10113 1 PesPrves 1970 -9 -A3'
.1 ss Marion.il Product per Capital
19H2
Gross lot low Public Loans as »
Exports 1982 IS ll
Public Fxternal Debt as * of GUP
1 3 , 2 6 4 1
5
Public Consumption as % of OOP 19A2 -22 2
Exports as » of GDP 19A2 -4 -24
Gross Domestic Product 1982 42 -49
External Public Debt [on? 49 -7
Private consumption as % COP 1982 -4 1 45
N.t Inflow Public External loans 197U 57 6
Growth in Private Consumption 1970-H2 17 -1
Growth in Imports 1970-82 10 17
Puhlic Consumption as \ of CL'P L'82 -16 -3
Public Fxternal Loans as » GDP I W0 T1 9
percent of Defense Expend 1 1 urns tn
Total Covernment E xpenditure' s 1"A1 -13 14
ij~wth in Exports 1970-82 12 -14
Growth in Exports 1960-70 -17 -2













55* -1 3 -4
•57* -15 1 7
62* 1 - 3
61* 1 7 1 3
1 3 88* -14









De termi n i nan ts Of The Share Of Military Expenditures














































Notesi See text for definition of variables
( ) « t statistic
r^ = correlation coefficient
F F statistics
DF M det^rees of freedom
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A comparison of the actual versus the predicted values in
Tab 1 e 41 is somewh at d i sap p o i n t i n g . Ue n e z u e 1 a ' s actual v a 1 u e
is only 70 percent of the p r e d i c t e d v a 1 u e
.
The step wise regression tor group I countries. Table 42,
indicates t h ere ar e two v ^r i ab 1 e s of s i gn i f i c an c e in
determining the share of mi 1 i tary expend i tures in the total
government budget. These variables are the share o-f the
mil i tary expenditures in the total government budget -for 1971
(GEDA) and other government expenditures as a percentage of
the total government budget CGEOB). These variables account
for 76 percent of the observed fluctuations in military
e x p e n d i tures.
Two sets o-f regressions were performed on the group II
countries in an attempt to see if factors that affect the
share of mil i tary expenditures in the total government budget
of Venezuela can be predicted without the use of past shares
of the budget. The first set, equations 1 through 4 on Table
43 contain the 1971 share of mi 1 i tary expend i tures in the
total government budget (GEDA) while the second set, equation
5 on Table 43 does not.
With regard to the first set, past shares of government
expenditures allocated to defense (GEDA) together with the
sh ar e of total gov e r nme n t e x p e n d i t u res i n gr oss n a t i on a
1
p r od u c t ( GETY B ) and the s h a re of p r i v ate c o n s urnp t i o n in g r os s
domestic product account for around 93 percent of the
fluctuations in the defense expenditures share of the budget.
101
Table 41
Share 0-t Mi 1 i tary Expend i tures In
































1. Ghana 3.700 9.678
2. Bratil 3.000 8.318
3. Costa Rica 2.600 6.321
0. Mexico 2.500 5.290
5. Sudan 13.200 22.133
6. Venezuela 3.900 5.535
7. Tantania 11.200 10.932
8. Spain 0.000 5.588
9. Parat;uav 13.200 15. 532
10. Malaysia 15.100 17.760
11. Thailand 20.600 23.875
12. Philippines 10.200 16.068
13. Tunisia 8.300 9.280
10. Svria 37.700 0.1.719
15. Kuwait 9.800 9.776
16. Chile 12.000 11.632
17. Israel 39.800 37. ««6
l fl . Drueuav 12.900 11.507
19. Bolivia 22.700 19.056
20. Korea 35.200 28. J*5
21. Argentina 11.000 9.130
22. Uganda 30.500 27.321
23. Peru 13.800 10.^00
20. Kenva 10.700 7.537
25. Morocco 16.200 10.692
26. Malawi 3.000 5.532
27. El Salvador 16.500 7.043
Notes 1
Based on regression equation
i
jFDB« 0.Q2GEDA - 0.18GS0B + 0.21TPRS
(10.52) (-2.06) (2.02)
Below * Countries whose Actual is less than 95^ of Predicted value
Above = Countries whose Actual is greater than 105^ of Predicted value
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Table 42
Determinants Of The Share Of Military Expenditures




GEDA GBOB RDTB r2 F DF
1 GKDB* 0.3**
(5.73) .701 32. «2 15
2 0.91 -0.27
(6.55) (-1.93) .767 21.49 15
3 0.96 -0.29 0.16
(6.73) (-2.01) (1.17) .792 15.19 15
Notes i See text for definition of variables
( ) * t statistic
r^ correlation coefficient
F = F statistic
DF = decrees of freedom
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Table 43
Determinants Ot The Share Ot Military Expenditure




}EDa CJETYB PRB SSPB PDB D3GA PDPA. RDTB r2 F DF
1 GEDB= 0.*
(°.5*) .390 73.41 10
2 1.04 -0.23
(10.24) (-2.25) .933 55."* 10
3 0.39 -0.36 -0.25
(3.53) (-2. n 5) (-1.99) .935 29.0" Q
4 0.39 -0.33 -0.17 0.23
(15.73) (-4.79) (-2.39) (3.91) ,9«4 77.7* 9
5 -0.45 -0.53 0.53 0.6«
(-3.49) (-3.5D (3.34) (4.92) .357 15.04 14
Notes i See text for definition of variables
( ) « t statistic
r2 • correlation coefficient
F * F statistic
DF a decrees of freedom
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Equation 5 indicates that over 85 percent of the -fluctuations
in the defense expenditures share of the total government
budget -for 1981 can be accounted for wi thout resorting to the
use o-f past budget shares. The variables that are
statistically significant are: ( 1 ) the e x t e r n a 1 de b t in 1982
(PDB); (2) the debt service to gross domestic product in 1970
<DSGA>; (3) the total external debt as a percentage o-f gross
dome s t i c pr odu ct in 1 970 ( PDPA > ; and < 4 ) the central
government domestic taxes as a percentage o-f total revenues.
This would lend evidence to the theory that one can
predict the fluctuations in the defense expenditures share of
the total government budget without using past shares of the
budget as a variable, although the results wou 1 d not be as
good as if past shares were included.
A comparison of actual versus predicted values in Table
44 shows that the predicted value for Venezuela is
approximately 12 percent greater than the actual value.
In summary, the basic regression equation for the share
of mil itary expenditures in the total government budget is
shown in Figure 14.
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Table 44
Share Ot Military Expenditures In Government



















1. Cost* Rica 2.600 5.9M
2. Dominican Rep. 3.900 W-.3M
3. Trinidad 2.000 2.907
*. Bratil 3.^00 k.ny*
5. Chile 12.000 13.533
6. Bolivia 22.700 22.371
7. Argentina Il.fcOO 11.062
a Nicaragua 11.000 10.^75
9. Peru 13. floo 12.373
10. Orueuav 12.CO0 11.992
11. Kl Salvador l6.*00 15.225
12. Venezuela 3.900 3.^57
13. Ecuador 11. "00 9.202
1«*. Para^uav 13.200 9.265
15. Mexico 2.500 1.705
Notes
i
Based on regression equationi
GEDB* -O.WPDB - 0.53DSGA + 0.53PDPA + 0.6<*DTB
(-3.^9) (-3.51) (3.«0 (*».93)
Below = Countries whose Actual is less than ^5* of Predicted value
Above Countries whose Actual is greater than 105^ of Predicted value
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Summary Q-f Regression Equation For The Share
t M i 1 i t a
r
y Expenditures In The Total
Gov e r nme nt Budget
Statistically Si gn i f i c an t With A Positive
Sign At The 95% Leu el
S t a t i s t i c a 1 1 y S i gn i t i c an t With A Ne ga t i v e
Sign At The 95% Leu el
Statistical 1 y I n s i qn i i i c a n t
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V. CONCLUSION
The analysis o-f the various measures of mill tary
expend i t u r e s h as sh own se v era 1 s i gn i t i cant pattern s .
Most of the observed differences in mi 1 i tary expenditures can
be explained e x c 1 u s i v e 1 y w i t h ec on om i c variables. Anal y s i s
of the patterns of military expenditures for developing
countries, as a total country sample, does not produce as
clear a pattern as that obtained from analyzing countries in
se per ate groups based on economic environments. As shown in
Table 20, Venezuelan defense spending can be accurately
predicted with the use of economic variables.
With this in mind, the analysis has demonstrated that
Venezuelan mi 1 i tary expenditures are not typical when
compared to less developed countries as a whole. However,
gr ou p i n g Venezuela i n a samp 1 e of countries, experiencing a
similar economic environment, produces results that indicate
Ve n e z u e 1 a s m i 1 i t ar y expenditures are 1 ar ge 1 y f u n c t i on s of
that environment! They are also typical of countries
experiencing similar- structural e c o n om i c c o n s t r a i n t s .
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